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ABSTRACT 
  This Article examines whether the jurisprudential and institutional 
premises of the doctrine of stare decisis retain their validity in the field 
of foreign affairs. The proper role of the judicial branch in foreign 
affairs has provoked substantial scholarly debate—historical, 
institutional, and normative—since the founding of the Republic. 
Precisely because of the sensitivity of the subject, the Supreme Court 
has both warned about the judicial branch’s comparative lack of 
expertise in the field and established a web of deference doctrines 
designed to protect against improvident judicial action. 
Notwithstanding all of this discussion, however, neither the Supreme 
Court nor any scholar has ever examined the complicated relationship 
between stare decisis and foreign affairs. 
  This Article first contextualizes the discussion with an analysis of 
the foundations of stare decisis. After a review of the values that 
animate the doctrine, it explores the subtly important jurisdictional 
premises of stare decisis. Almost entirely overlooked by both courts 
and scholars, these inherent jurisdictional limitations on the force of 
precedent have direct implications for the proper role of stare decisis 
in foreign affairs law. The Article then examines the special 
constitutional arrangement of powers in the field, in particular the 
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respective roles of Congress and the executive. Just as significant, the 
Article also canvasses the multiplicity of avenues by which the 
American legal system channels foreign affairs issues to the federal 
courts. This growing interbranch tension highlights the significance of 
reflexively cloaking the resultant judicial precedents with full stare 
decisis effect. 
  The analysis in this Article demonstrates that in fact a more 
nuanced and accommodating understanding of precedent is required 
with respect to certain fundamental aspects of foreign affairs law. For 
purely domestic statutes, fidelity to the value judgments first made by 
Congress within and for the domestic legal system should avoid both 
the fact and appearance of independent judicial agency. Moreover, 
when Congress takes it upon itself to define the entire content of the 
law—without importing international legal norms—the courts need 
look only to familiar domestic sources and materials in their 
interpretive inquiries. 
  Matters are different, however, for the broad and expanding field 
of controversies that likewise fall within the Article III “judicial 
Power” but that involve the courts in the enforcement of rights or 
obligations grounded in international law. Within this field, the 
analysis in this Article demonstrates that the likelihood and 
consequences of judicial error are greater, that precedents are 
particularly susceptible to rapid erosion by exogenous forces of 
change, and that institutional considerations make judicial leadership 
that has been fortified by rigid precedent particularly problematic. It 
ultimately concludes that these distinct considerations should function 
as an additional “special justification” for reexamining international-
law precedents. Consistent with the systemic values of stare decisis, 
however, the reexamination power should exist only for the issuing 
court; lower courts in the hierarchically integrated judicial branch—
courts that are subject to the vertical dimension of stare decisis—
should remain bound by precedents to the full extent of existing law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Stare decisis and the law of foreign affairs seem to inhabit 
entirely different jurisprudential worlds with no apparent means of 
communication. In matters of foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has 
often warned about the judicial branch’s comparative lack of 
expertise and inability to gauge the implications of its judgments for 
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external relations.1 Separately, a web of deference doctrines and 
related interpretive presumptions function to protect against 
improvident judicial detours into foreign affairs, especially on matters 
of international law.2 Together, these related considerations 
constitute admonitions to the courts about the unfamiliarity of the 
terrain and the consequent risks of judicial leadership in the field. 
Curiously, however, these concerns seemingly evaporate once a 
court creates a precedent. An analysis of stare decisis jurisprudence 
fails to uncover any sensitivity to the special risks and “collateral 
consequences”3 of judicial error in foreign affairs matters. That is, ex 
ante admonitions about improvident judicial action do not find even 
the faintest echo in the stare decisis force of judicial precedents ex 
post. My goal here is to mine this curiosity. 
The proper role of the judicial branch in foreign affairs has 
provoked substantial scholarly debate—historical, institutional, and 
normative—since the founding of the Republic.4 In all of this 
 
 1. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (observing 
that “when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [national security 
and foreign affairs], ‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked’” (quoting 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981))); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363, 386 (2000) (“We have . . . recognized the limits of our own capacity to ‘determin[e] 
precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular acts.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983))); Chi. & S. Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (declaring that decisions in foreign 
affairs are “delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy . . . . of a kind for which 
the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility”); infra notes 138–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (declaring that the executive 
branch’s views on the interpretation of treaties are entitled to “great weight”); Medellín v. 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361 (2008) (same); infra notes 194–96, 340–45 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004) (emphasizing the “collateral 
consequences” of recognizing domestically enforceable torts for violations of international law).  
 4. For an introduction to the voluminous scholarship on the propriety of judicial 
deference to the political branches in foreign affairs, see generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS? (1992); Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 
(1976); and Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1450 (2006). Relatedly, few issues have excited as many scholarly debates as the power of 
federal courts to apply international law on their own initiative. See generally Anthony J. Bellia, 
Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2009); 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: 
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. 
Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing 
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); Lea Brilmayer, International Law in 
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991); Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). 
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discussion, however, the relationship between foreign affairs and 
stare decisis has been met with little comment5 and no detailed 
analysis. Similarly, the Supreme Court has never seriously examined 
whether the prudential and institutional premises of stare decisis 
retain their validity in the field of foreign affairs, even for precedents 
that define the United States’ sovereign obligations under 
international law.6 Indeed, aside from including marginal notes in a 
pair of dissents,7 the Court missed two prime opportunities to opine 
on the subject in the opening years of the twenty-first century.8 
The analysis in this Article demonstrates that a more nuanced 
understanding of precedent is appropriate with respect to certain 
fundamental aspects of foreign affairs law. Judicial rulings on the 
Constitution’s allocation of powers in the field are already subject to 
a less rigorous version of stare decisis.9 In light of the practical 
impossibility of correction by the political branches, sound reasons 
 
 5. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT 
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (2006) (observing that 
“interstitial uses of international law” by the judiciary “are subject to subsequent legislative 
overruling, but [that] courts also can choose to abandon them on their own initiative in the face 
of reflection and experience”); Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 98, 106 (Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon & 
William D. Rogers eds., 1990) (suggesting that stare decisis need not require “that rules of 
decision regarding international law in U.S. court cases are binding in all later cases”); Harlan 
G. Cohen, Undead Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
957, 990–95 (2010) (analyzing the historical significance of precedents in the shadow of World 
War II); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 486 
(2003) (noting briefly that the difficulty of override by the political branches might justify a 
weakened form of stare decisis for international-law precedents). 
 6. Other than in cases considering constitutional allocations of power, the Supreme Court 
has rarely even paused to mention the force of precedent in cases with implications for foreign 
affairs. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516 (1947) (refusing to revisit a treaty precedent 
because of consistent judicial interpretation over time and because of the plain language of the 
treaty); The Adula, 176 U.S. 361, 371 (1900) (refusing to overrule an international-law 
precedent simply “to conform to the opinions of foreign writers as to what they suppose to be 
the existing law upon the subject”); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) 
(acknowledging the possibility of a “controlling . . . judicial decision” on international law); 
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 22 (1899) (concluding that the subsequent practical construction of 
a treaty by the executive branch was not so compelling as to “warrant the court in overruling its 
own opinions” on the matter). 
 7. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 389–90 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 689 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra note 248 
and accompanying text. 
 8. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331; infra notes 
244–52 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
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support this outcome.10 The special concern in this Article is instead 
the broad and expanding swath of controversies that likewise fall 
within the Article III “judicial Power”11 but that involve the courts in 
the identification of rights or obligations under international law. 
Inquiries into such matters, by their nature, inject the judicial branch 
into the uncharacteristic position of leadership in defining the very 
content of the nation’s formal legal relations with foreign states. My 
analysis demonstrates, moreover, that even the basic premises of 
stare decisis become unreliable, and in some respects fail to obtain at 
all, when courts create precedents on such matters. 
In contrast, foreign-policy implications should not compromise 
the foundations of stare decisis for purely domestic statutes. When 
Congress takes it upon itself to define the entire content of the law—
without importing international norms—the relationship between 
lawmaker and law applier is solely an internal, domestic affair. To be 
sure, congressional statutes, and thus judicial interpretations of them, 
may have consequences for foreign relations.12 But fidelity to the 
value judgments first made by Congress within its constitutionally 
delegated authority should mitigate any concerns about independent 
judicial agency in foreign affairs lawmaking. Standard approaches to 
precedent founded on standard institutional relationships remain 
appropriate here.13 
To establish the context for an analysis of these points, Part I 
first reviews the jurisprudential and institutional foundations of stare 
decisis. The force of a given precedent ultimately hinges on weighing 
the systemic values of stability, predictability, and judicial legitimacy 
against a set of situation-specific “antivalues” that focus on the 
precedent’s original and continuing validity. But as I show in Part I, 
the notion of adherence to precedent is also animated by an 
appreciation of the respective constitutional stations of the judicial 
branch and Congress. That Part then explores the subtly important 
jurisdictional premises of stare decisis. Almost entirely overlooked by 
courts and scholars, these inherent jurisdictional limitations on the 
 
 10. See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 12. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 13. See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
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force of precedent have direct implications for the proper place of 
stare decisis in matters of international law. 
The Constitution’s special arrangement of authority over foreign 
affairs is the subject of the analysis in Part II. In this field as well, 
Congress remains the preeminent domestic lawmaker. But in its text 
and structure, the Constitution also allocates special responsibilities 
to the executive in managing the nation’s relations with foreign states. 
This enhanced executive authority provides the backdrop for the web 
of admonitions about the risks of untutored judicial action in foreign 
affairs. The friction arises, however, from the expanding mandate of 
the courts to participate in the definition of rights and obligations 
under international law. To highlight the significance of this growing 
interbranch tension, Part II canvasses the multiplicity of avenues—
treaties, “treaty-statutes,” delegated lawmaking authority, 
“international law cum common law,”14 executive agreements, and 
metanorms of interpretation—through which the American legal 
system now channels such matters to the courts. 
This all provides the foundation for an examination in Part III of 
the proper relationship between the Article III “judicial Power” in 
foreign affairs and the doctrine of stare decisis. That Part first 
explains why judicial enforcement of international law differs as a 
matter of kind, not merely of degree, from the application of law of a 
purely domestic origin. The necessary consequence of precedent in 
foreign matters is the definition of rights or obligations that govern 
the nation’s legal relations with foreign states. Indeed, one might view 
international law as the “hardest” form of foreign relations law.15 The 
gravity of this responsibility, properly appreciated, should alone give 
courts pause before reflexively cloaking foreign affairs precedents 
with full stare decisis effect. 
Careful analysis reveals that the values that animate stare decisis 
become unstable when courts create precedents founded on 
international law. Even when legal norms have been validated by 
domestic authorities, their origin—the source from which they derive 
their content—remains the international legal system. And in contrast 
to the mechanisms for interpreting purely domestic statutes, the only 
 
 14. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (coining this term to describe 
federal common law derived from customary international law). 
 15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1 (1987) (stating that the foreign-relations law of the United States consists of both 
domestic law that has substantial effects on foreign relations and “international law as it applies 
to the United States”). 
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mechanism for the interpretation and clarification of international 
law is a multipolar system of judicial cooperation that entirely lacks 
hierarchical integration. 
As a result, the factual and doctrinal premises of a “final” 
decision on an international-law norm, even a decision by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, may be subject to almost immediate destabilization 
in the same legal system from which the norm emerged and in which 
it continues to operate. As Part III.B explores, this international legal 
structure again contrasts with standard congressional statutes. Unlike 
in the domestic realm, the disaggregated process of the interpretation 
and enforcement of international law creates substantial forces of 
judicial change exogenous to the domestic system and thus beyond 
the control of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the cultural, legal, 
linguistic, and related differences among international lawmakers 
greatly increase the risk of judicial error from the outset. These 
uncertainties combine to compromise the “calm”16 that stare decisis is 
designed to secure and reinforce. 
Consider as an illustration of this point the Supreme Court’s 
series of cases on the domestic enforcement of certain individual 
rights protected by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.17 
In two initial decisions, the Court expressly determined that protected 
individuals could waive their treaty rights under domestic procedural 
rules.18 Although definitive as a matter of domestic stare decisis, these 
decisions could not control even immediate developments under 
international law. Within only a few years, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) had interpreted the treaty in a directly contrary way19 
and had then ordered the United States to take certain remedial 
 
 16. The term “stare decisis” derives from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta 
movere—that is, “stand by the precedents and do not disturb the calm.” John Paul Stevens, The 
Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.2 (1983) (quoting Stanley Reed, 
Address, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law, 9 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 131, 131 (1938)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 17. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
 18. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1999) (per 
curiam) (holding that because the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity, 
Germany could not prevent Arizona’s execution of a German prisoner); Breard v. Greene, 523 
U.S. 371, 375–76 (1998) (per curiam) (“Claims not [raised in state court] are considered 
defaulted. By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, Breard failed to exercise 
his rights under the Vienna Convention . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 19. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 61, 63 (Mar. 
31) (stating that detaining authorities must respect the treaty rights of foreign nationals). 
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actions on behalf of affected individuals.20 The ICJ authoritatively 
rejected the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the international-
treaty obligations of the United States. Unfortunately, however, in 
two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refused to give effect to the 
ICJ’s interpretation and thereby failed to recognize the inability of 
domestic stare decisis to create “calm” with respect to matters of 
international law.21 
An institutional perspective on stare decisis also supports a more 
accommodating understanding of the proper force of international-
law precedents. The enforcement of norms derived from international 
law, as I explain in Part III.C, involves a kind of problematic judicial 
discretion, and thus judicial leadership, that differs in essence from 
the application of purely domestic law. I then confront the most 
obvious and significant institutional counterargument: the availability 
of congressional override. Congress may well have the power to 
overturn a judicial precedent founded on international law, and 
perhaps even a precedent founded on the interpretation of treaties.22 
Nonetheless, this formal argument ultimately is based upon a legally 
suspect and factually unrealistic inversion of the Constitution’s 
prescribed lawmaking sequence—Congress creates, the courts 
apply—for law Congress did not even create in the first place. Part III 
then concludes with an analysis of the proper means of calibrating 
stare decisis with the special responsibilities of the executive in 
foreign affairs. 
The final Part distills the various themes into a summary analysis. 
I conclude that extant stare decisis norms remain appropriate for 
purely domestic statutes and regulations, even those that affect 
foreign affairs. My conclusions are different, however, for the judicial 
enforcement of international law. To be sure, even in that arena, the 
systemic and institutional values of stare decisis justify a prima facie 
respect for precedent. But the analysis in Part IV demonstrates that 
 
 20. See id. ¶¶ 121–23, 138–43, 153(9) (finding “that the appropriate reparation in this case 
consists in the obligation of the United States of America to provide . . . review and 
reconsideration of the convictions and sentences” of the affected individuals). 
 21. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358 (2008) (concluding that domestic courts are 
not bound by ICJ decisions); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352–60 (2006) (“Nothing 
in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be 
conclusive on our courts.” (footnote omitted)). For a more detailed analysis of this example, see 
infra notes 246–50 and accompanying text. 
 22. Indeed, in response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), Congress purported 
to do just that. See infra notes 311–13. 
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the distinctive considerations that attend judicial action involving 
international law should function as a significant weight on the 
scale—that is, as an additional “special justification”23 for revisiting 
the original and continuing validity of a precedent. Enhanced 
modesty of this type should strengthen the institutional position of 
the judiciary, for it would permit, but not require, the reexamination 
of a precedent as an alternative to routine ex ante acquiescence to the 
executive branch’s policy preferences. 
The argument for increased flexibility toward international-law 
precedents is especially compelling for the federal courts of appeals. 
As they do for most matters, these regional courts create the vast 
bulk of precedents on international law.24 Because of this reality, I 
address their particularly misguided, and nearly rigid, stare decisis 
practices in a separate section at the end of Part IV. 
Over the years, an aphorism from Justice Brandeis has become a 
darling of stare decisis enthusiasts. “[I]n most matters,” he declared, 
“it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than 
that it be settled right.”25 The analysis in this Article strongly suggests, 
however, that the significant and sensitive subject of our nation’s 
international legal relations is not one of those routine “most 
matters.” In any event, neither of Justice Brandeis’s alternative 
propositions fully holds for disputed issues in the field of foreign 
affairs. The special circumstances in that field decrease substantially 
the likelihood that a first judicial impression actually will settle the 
matter or that it will be right in the first place. 
I.  THE FOUNDATIONS OF STARE DECISIS 
A. Understanding the Notion of Precedent 
For the common-law mind steeped in the tradition of progressive 
advancement on a foundation of progressively refined reason, there is 
 
 23. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (explaining that 
departure from precedent requires a “special justification”); infra notes 55–57 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 384–85. 
 25. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). For endorsements of 
Justice Brandeis’s statement by the Supreme Court, see, for example, John R. Sand & Gravel 
Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 757 (2008); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); and New York v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 572, 590 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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a self-evident quality to the notion of precedent. Precedent appeals to 
primal desires for—and, in a system of laws, justified expectations 
of—rationality, regularity, and stability.26 Indeed, Justice Cardozo’s 
famous metaphor that judges merely “lay [their] own course of bricks 
on the secure foundation of the courses” of their forebears27 is now so 
ingrained in common-law thinking as to seem almost trite.28 
But stare decisis also marches in service of loftier causes. 
Stripped to its essence, the concept of binding precedent is a self-
imposed rule-of-law norm for the judiciary.29 That is, by constraining 
situational discretion, stare decisis reflects the proposition that 
objectively determined rules of law are binding on an independently 
constituted judicial branch. Stare decisis might even be a 
jurisprudential imperative. As Justice Breyer confidently declared in 
Randall v. Sorrell,30 “[T]he rule of law demands that adhering to our 
prior case law be the norm.”31 
Self-evident propositions can be tricky things, however. The 
Constitution nowhere expressly empowers the federal judiciary to 
endow its own opinions with a legal force that binds subsequent 
courts. Since the Court’s landmark holding in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,32 moreover, “[f]ederal courts . . . [have] not possess[ed] a 
general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.”33 
Stare decisis butts up against this principle as one approaches the 
 
 26. See infra notes 41–54 and accompanying text. 
 27. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921).  
 28. Justice Stevens has been a particular fan of this quotation. See, e.g., District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2824 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rita v. United States, 
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2470 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 
711 (1995) (Stevens, J.). 
 29. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“[I]t is indisputable 
that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch . . . .”), superseded 
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones v. 
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 752 (1988) (“A general judicial adherence 
to constitutional precedent supports a consensus about the rule of law, specifically the belief 
that all organs of government, including the Court, are bound by the law.”). 
 30. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).  
 31. Id. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution 
requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”). 
 32. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general 
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a 
State . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal 
courts.”). 
 33. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981). 
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more absolute edges of the notion of adherence to precedent. No 
matter how faithful a court may be in discerning the law established 
by others, communication across time, institutions, and circumstances 
inevitably involves uncertainty and, thus, choice. The power to 
interpret, in short, is infected with the temptation, and sometimes the 
need, to create. A version of stare decisis that would consecrate every 
legal ruling with unyielding permanence thus would transform judicial 
interpreters into lawmakers in every sense but name. 
It should not be surprising, then, that the Supreme Court founds 
its modern canon of stare decisis not on constitutional compulsions or 
even powers but rather on prudential impulses anchored, as I have 
suggested, in the rule of law.34 As is so often the case with this 
doctrine, the Court has a quotation of ancient lineage ready-made for 
any serious discussion of the issue: “[I]t is common wisdom,” the 
Court has frequently observed, “that the rule of stare decisis is not an 
‘inexorable command.’”35 It is, rather, “a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”36 
The word “policy” here, however, carries a serious risk of 
misdirection. To some skeptics, the absence of any absolute formula 
 
 34. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 243–44 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (“The Court has pointed 
out that stare decisis ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of 
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ Stare decisis thereby avoids the instability and 
unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations. For this reason, the rule of 
law demands that adhering to our prior case law be the norm.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556–57 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“Stare decisis 
is not an ‘inexorable command,’ but the doctrine is ‘of fundamental importance to the rule of 
law.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior 
holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of 
the rule of law . . . .”); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (“Time and 
time again, this Court has recognized that ‘the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental 
importance to the rule of law.’ Adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and 
respect for judicial authority.” (citations omitted) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & 
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (plurality opinion))); Welch, 483 U.S. at 478–79 (“The 
rule of law depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis.”). 
 35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see 
also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable 
command . . . .” (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)) (internal quotation 
mark omitted)); Harris, 536 U.S. at 556 (“Stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command . . . .’” 
(quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).  
 36. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
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has served merely to open the gates for selective manipulation to suit 
judges’ subjective predilections.37 But the Supreme Court “[t]ime and 
time again” has emphasized the “fundamental importance” of stare 
decisis for the rule of law in our case-based system.38 And as I 
demonstrate in Section B, this observation has teeth, for departure 
from precedent is considered an “exceptional”39 move allowable only 
pursuant to a “compelling” justification.40 
B. The Values that Animate Stare Decisis 
The notion that judges should adhere to authoritative decisions 
of the past has a deep lineage in America’s common-law heritage.41 
After two hundred years of domestic judicial pronouncements on the 
subject,42 legal scholars have had ample source material for 
examinations of the foundations of stare decisis.43 Thus, although a 
 
 37. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 404 (1988) (“The doctrine of stare decisis . . . is 
inherently subjective, and few judges, including Supreme Court Justices, can resist the natural 
temptation to manipulate it.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: 
May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1598 
(2000) (“The Supreme Court’s practice today is plainly one of selective stare decisis in the first 
place. Precedent is followed, except when it isn’t.”). 
 38. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (quoting Welch, 483 U.S. at 494); see also Randall, 548 U.S. at 
243–44 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (citing numerous cases that emphasize the importance of stare 
decisis). 
 39. Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
 40. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202; see also infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
 41. The famous Commentaries by James Kent in 1826 traced the notion of precedent to 
judicial practice during the reign of Edward III in the fourteenth century. See 1 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *476–77 (O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1826) (“[F]rom the reign of Edward III. to that of Henry VII., the judges 
were incessantly urging the sacredness of precedents, and that a counsellor was not to be heard 
who spoke against them, and that they ought to judge as the ancient sages taught.”). 
 42. For an historical review of American practice, see generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare 
Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 647 (1999).  
 43. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 1173 (2006) (discussing the pragmatic arguments for stare decisis and the relationship 
between originalism and stare decisis); Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing 
Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995) (analyzing the role of stare decisis in the Court’s effort 
to appear principled); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 411 (2010) (aiming “to isolate the various components of the Supreme Court’s stare decisis 
jurisprudence and to study their individual and collective functions”); Lee, supra note 42 
(tracking “the primary aspects of the Rehnquist Court’s doctrine of stare decisis from founding-
era commentary to [its] origins in decisions of the Supreme Court”); Paulsen, supra note 37 
(examining “whether Congress may abrogate stare decisis in a particular class of constitutional 
cases (or in federal question cases generally)”).  
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careful appreciation of the values that animate stare decisis is 
essential for my subsequent analysis of the proper role of the doctrine 
in the field of foreign affairs, a brief review will suffice here. 
The Supreme Court itself settled some time ago on a customary 
formulation for the justification of stare decisis. According to the 
Court, the doctrine “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles.”44 Adherence to precedent 
likewise “fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the 
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”45 When 
considered carefully, these broad values coalesce into three essential, 
interrelated categories: stability, predictability, and legitimacy.46 
The most recognizable value of stare decisis is its ability to 
enhance stability and consistency across time and similar 
circumstances.47 At its most elemental level, it satisfies the impulse 
that, all other things being equal, a legal system is better advised to 
resolve matters firmly and finally than to search for normatively more 
appealing solutions on a case-by-case basis.48 In the same vein, 
adherence to precedent fosters the orderly and efficient 
administration of justice by discouraging successive relitigation of 
issues that have already been authoritatively resolved.49 
Stability functions in tandem with predictability. Adherence to 
precedent establishes a framework for efficient public and private 
 
 44. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 827 (1991)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light 
Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting that stare decisis “serves the broader 
societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and predictable application of legal rules”).  
 45. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (quoting United 
States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)) (internal quotation mark omitted); 
see also Hilton, 502 U.S.at 202 (“Adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and 
respect for judicial authority.”). 
 46. For articles discussing this taxonomy, see Hellman, supra note 43, at 1109–11; and Lee, 
supra note 42, at 652–53.  
 47. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (observing that 
“legal stability” is the goal of “[p]rinciples of stare decisis”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is essential . . . to the stability of the law.”); supra note 
44. 
 48. This point, of course, is the thrust of the Justice Brandeis aphorism quoted in the 
Introduction. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 49. The standard, almost obligatory, quotation supporting this proposition comes from 
Justice Cardozo. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403–04 (1970) 
(declaring that stare decisis advances the interest of “fair and expeditious adjudication by 
eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case”); see also CARDOZO, 
supra note 27, at 149 (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if 
every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”). 
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planning.50 The resulting reliance interests, in turn, make out a 
compelling claim for legal protection.51 Not surprisingly, this 
reasoning is particularly germane with respect to principles 
reaffirmed by “iteration and reiteration over a long period of time.”52 
Finally, stare decisis serves to sustain the public’s trust in a 
principled, law-bound judiciary. In other words, adherence to 
precedent reinforces both the fact and the perception that in 
America’s constitutional system, federal courts fundamentally are not 
lawmakers; their role, rather, is to identify and apply the objective 
rules of law that have been generated by the political branches.53 In 
the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, stare decisis “permits society 
to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than 
in the proclivities of individuals.”54 
C. The Stare Decisis Antivalues: The Justifications for Reexamining 
Precedent 
Under the combined weight of these considerations, the doctrine 
of stare decisis ultimately functions as a strong presumption against 
revisiting precedent. The Supreme Court has described this 
presumption in a variety of ways, but the basic thrust has been the 
same: stare decisis imposes a “severe burden” on those judges who 
 
 50. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (“Stare decisis . . . avoids the 
instability and unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations.”); Hilton, 502 
U.S. at 202 (observing that “[a]dherence to precedent promotes stability [and] predictability”); 
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 812–15 (2002) 
(observing that the certainty enhanced by adherence to precedent creates a “framework for less 
costly, more accurate, and thus more effective planning for future activity”). 
 51. The cases in which the Supreme Court has emphasized this point are legion. See, e.g., 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2007) (“[R]eliance on 
a judicial opinion is a significant reason to adhere to it . . . .”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding . . . . we may 
ask . . . whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling . . . .”). This principle is especially forceful in property and 
commercial matters. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56 (observing that “the classic case for weighing 
reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial context”); Payne, 
501 U.S. at 828 (declaring that “stare decisis [is] at [its] acme in cases involving property and 
contract rights”).  
 52. Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
 53. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 865–66 (examining in detail the role stare decisis plays in 
advancing the legitimacy of the judicial branch); Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (declaring that stare 
decisis “contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process”). For a broader 
analysis of this factor, see Hellman, supra note 43, at 1112, 1115–20.  
 54. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986). 
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are dissatisfied with established case law.55 Disavowal of precedent 
thus is “exceptional”56 and requires, as the Court has observed, “the 
most convincing of reasons.”57 
Nevertheless, the doctrine is one of prudence and pragmatism. 
Even supreme courts are fallible. To avoid both ossification in the law 
and unthinking adherence to past mistakes, a rational doctrine of 
precedent must leave some room for reconsideration. To this end, the 
Supreme Court has recognized what can be seen as a set of stare 
decisis antivalues, which balance the system by permitting the review 
and correction of conspicuous judicial misfires of the past. 
Although the grounds for overruling precedent are easily stated, 
their application is necessarily highly specific to each particular 
situation. One standard consideration is whether a precedent has 
proved to be “unworkable” in practice.58 On a similar note, 
reconsideration is appropriate when an earlier decision is seen as 
poorly reasoned from the outset or otherwise “has been the subject of 
continuing controversy and confusion.”59 When carefully considered, 
each of these related ideas is simply another way of saying that a 
particular precedent never succeeded in establishing the stability and 
predictability that justify stare decisis in the first place. 
An even more significant consideration has been the influence of 
subsequent developments on the foundation of a precedent. 
Reevaluation of a precedent is justified when “facts have so changed, 
or [have] come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old 
rule of significant application or justification.”60 “Of most relevance,” 
 
 55. Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“The 
doctrine of stare decisis imposes a severe burden on the litigant who asks us to disavow one of 
our precedents.”). 
 56. Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 
 57. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010); see also, e.g., Hilton v. S.C. Pub. 
Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (“[W]e will not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis 
without some compelling justification.”). 
 58. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (stating that overruling 
might be justified when a decision “has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability”).  
 59. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977); see also Montejo, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2088–89 (“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the 
principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, 
and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.”). 
 60. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817 (2009) 
(relying on “a considerable body of new experience” to overrule a precedent); Randall, 548 U.S. 
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however, has been the effect of intervening developments in the law 
itself.61 The “primary reason” for overruling precedent, the Supreme 
Court has declared, is that “either the growth of judicial doctrine or 
further action taken by Congress . . . . ha[s] removed or weakened the 
conceptual underpinnings from [a] prior decision.”62 Thus, for 
example, in the 2007 case of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc.,63 the Court chronicled nearly one hundred years of 
corrosive case-law developments to justify overruling an established 
precedent on the per se invalidity of vertical price restraints.64 
D. Institutional and Instrumental Considerations 
A further fixture of stare decisis jurisprudence is perhaps the 
most important for understanding the doctrine in application. The 
Supreme Court has long held that stare decisis is most potent in 
statutory cases and is weakest in constitutional cases.65 At its most 
 
at 244 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (declining to overrule a precedent because of the absence of a 
showing “that circumstances ha[d] changed so radically as to undermine [its] critical factual 
assumptions”). 
 61. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007) (“Of 
most relevance, ‘we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined 
their doctrinal underpinnings.’” (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000))). 
 62. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. 
Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 
(1995) (declaring that stare decisis may yield when a precedent’s “underpinnings [have been] 
eroded, by subsequent decisions of [the] Court”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (observing that 
review of a precedent might be justified when “related principles of law have so far developed 
as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”).  
 63. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
 64. See id. at 2710 (overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373 (1911), which “established the rule that it is per se illegal under [federal antitrust law] for a 
manufacturer to agree with its distributor to set the minimum price the distributor can charge 
for the manufacturer’s goods”). 
 65. See, e.g., Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816–17 (“[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily 
in the area of statutory construction . . . .” (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 
(1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. 
Ct. 750, 756–57 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has ‘special 
force’ . . . .” (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73)); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73 
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for 
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, . . . Congress remains free to alter 
what we have done.”). Some leading scholars have criticized this established Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 
1361, 1398–1409 (1988) (arguing against a heightened form of stare decisis for statutory cases); 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 40–54 (1988) 
(advancing a similar critique). At the other end of the spectrum, some critics have questioned 
the propriety of weakened stare decisis in constitutional cases. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, 
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elemental level, this distinction is grounded in the availability—both 
formally and practically—of alternative constitutional vehicles for 
error correction. Stated simply, when a court interprets a statute, the 
legislative branch is available to correct, update, or otherwise revise 
the judicial determination. Thus, as the Supreme Court has reiterated, 
“considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory 
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s 
interpretation of its legislation.”66 So potent is this principle that 
Justice Scalia has described it as an “almost categorical rule of stare 
decisis in statutory cases.”67 
The institutional landscape is quite different in constitutional 
cases. When the Supreme Court grounds a decision in the 
Constitution, the only vehicles for revision or adaptation are the 
Court itself and the amendment procedure of Article V.68 Precisely 
because correction through the latter option “is practically 
impossible,”69 stare decisis in constitutional cases “is at its weakest.”70 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared that constitutional 
precedents in foreign affairs matters in particular “afford little 
precedential value for subsequent cases.”71 To be sure, here as well 
 
Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 429–33 (1988) (“I want 
to kick sand on the shibboleth that it should be easier to overrule a constitutional decision than 
a statutory or common law decision.”); Monaghan, supra note 29, at 741–42 (noting that the 
main argument in favor of a weak constitutional stare decisis is that “correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible” but asserting that “the argnment’s [sic] central factual 
premise is overdrawn” (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406–07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816–17 (quoting Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 756–57 (making a similar observation). 
For a broad analysis of this issue, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). 
 67. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 493 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Eskridge, supra 
note 65, at 1363–69 (reviewing critically the Supreme Court’s “super-strong presumption against 
overruling statutory precedents”).  
 68. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the amendment procedure). 
 69. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 828 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). History abundantly proves the point. What 
Justice Brandeis observed in 1932 continues to ring true: “In only two instances—the Eleventh 
and the Sixteenth Amendments—has the process of constitutional amendment been successfully 
resorted to, to nullify decisions of this Court.” Burnet, 285 U.S. at 409 n.5 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 70. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Stare 
decisis is not an inexorable command . . . . This is particularly true in constitutional cases, 
because in such cases ‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’” (quoting 
Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
 71. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981). 
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the requirement of special justification remains.72 Nonetheless, it is 
not uncommon for the Court to revisit even recent constitutional 
precedents, as its controversial decision in Citizens United v. FEC73 
demonstrated.74 
The justification for differential application of stare decisis runs 
deeper, however, than the mere fact that expedient, nonjudicial 
sources of error correction are more readily available in cases of 
statutory interpretation than in cases of constitutional interpretation. 
Rather, the distinction finds essential color and texture in the courts’ 
respect for the distinct constitutional allocations of authority to—and, 
presumably, the derivative institutional competences of—the judicial 
branch and Congress. The doctrine is thus animated not only by 
which institution is, but also by which institution should be, the 
principal source of continued development in a given field of law. 
When a court interprets a statute, it operates against the 
backdrop of the legislative competence of Congress acting within its 
constitutionally founded lawmaking powers. The special force of stare 
decisis in statutory cases recognizes the primacy of Congress in 
Article I lawmaking by deferring to the original lawmakers for 
correction, adjustment, or modernization of their own legislative 
products. As the Supreme Court thus observed in Neal v. United 
States,75 “Our reluctance to overturn [statutory] precedents derives in 
part from institutional concerns about the relationship of the 
Judiciary to Congress. . . . Congress, not this Court, has the 
responsibility for revising its statutes.”76 
In constitutional matters, by contrast, the Supreme Court “bears 
the ultimate obligation for the development of the law as institutions 
 
 72. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“Even in 
constitutional cases, in which stare decisis concerns are less pronounced, we will not overrule a 
precedent absent a ‘special justification.’” (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 
(1984))). 
 73. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 74. See id. at 911–12 (overruling in part McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).  
 75. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). 
 76. Id. at 295–96; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) 
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for 
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is 
implicated . . . .”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); Lawrence C. 
Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 177, 208–15 (1989) (exploring a “heightened or absolute rule of statutory stare 
decisis”).  
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develop.”77 In other words, in a tradition derived from no less than 
Marbury v. Madison,78 the Court has assigned itself ultimate authority 
over the meaning of the Constitution.79 The judicial branch, therefore, 
is the institution with the independence and expertise to review—and, 
as appropriate, to correct and update—prior constitutional 
precedents. 
The role of these institutional considerations in relation to the 
rare subject of federal common law is unclear.80 Lacking guidance 
from the Supreme Court, some scholars assume that common-law 
decisions enjoy a “normal” level of precedential force.81 Others take 
the view, in contrast, that the strong version of stare decisis for 
statutory decisions should apply to common-law precedents as well.82 
This matter, of course, will return to significance in my later review of 
“international law cum common law.”83 It suffices at this point to 
observe that the Supreme Court seemingly has endorsed a more 
relaxed version of the doctrine of stare decisis when courts take the 
lead in developing the law based on a corresponding delegation of 
authority from Congress.84 
E. The Unexamined Boundaries of Stare Decisis 
Finally, inherent in the doctrine of binding precedent is a 
principle that courts and scholars have almost entirely overlooked: 
stare decisis is inseparably bound up in, and constrained by, the 
concept of jurisdiction. As I explain, I use the term “jurisdiction” in 
its essential sense of the realm of authority within which a court has 
the power to declare the law. Alexander Hamilton once aptly parsed 
 
 77. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221 (1961). 
 78. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 79. See id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”).  
 80. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
 81. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 67, at 1366 (“Presumably, common law precedents would 
continue to enjoy the normal stare decisis presumption.”); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 
66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 388 (1988) (“Common-law precedents provide the benchmark against 
which other case law is measured.”).  
 82. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 76, at 222 (arguing that the separation-of-power concerns 
that support “an absolute rule of stare decisis in statutory cases” apply to federal common-law 
precedents as well); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of 
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common law’ and 
‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind.”). 
 83. See infra notes 177–86 and accompanying text. 
 84. See infra notes 377–78 and accompanying text. 
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the concept in the same way. “[J]urisdiction,” he observed, “is 
composed of JUS and DICTO, juris, dictio, or a speaking or 
pronouncing of the law.”85 
Courts of law derive their power to issue authoritative rulings 
from a particular polity. They are, in the first instance, legally 
constituted by such a polity.86 At a more immediate and concrete 
level, this foundational source of power also defines whether a court 
has adjudicative authority—in American legal idioms, subject-matter 
and personal jurisdiction—over a particular dispute.87 When so 
constituted and when within their legal mandate, courts exercise a 
distinct function on behalf of their state: in Montesquieu’s famous 
allocation, the “power of judging” over individual controversies.88 It is 
thus not by accident that the Constitution vests “the judicial Power of 
the United States” in the Supreme Court and “in such inferior courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”89 
Woven into this notion of judicial power is the authority to 
resolve disputed issues of law in a binding and—for the common-law 
mind at least90—final manner. This authority exists, however, only 
within the framework of the legal system from which the declaring 
court has derived its mandate. Although tautological, one may find 
insight in the observation that a court has the power to create 
precedent only within the legal system for which it has the power to 
speak with finality. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for 
example, could no more make binding pronouncements for New 
York courts on the law of New York than the legislature of 
 
 85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 489 & n.* (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  
 86. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing “one supreme Court” and empowering 
Congress to establish inferior federal courts). 
 87. In international law, this concept is captured by the term “jurisdiction to adjudicate.” 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 401(b) (1987) (“Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on . . . jurisdiction to 
adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative 
tribunals . . . .”). 
 88. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller 
& Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (recognizing a 
“power of judging” that is distinct from the legislative power and executive powers).  
 89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 90. As noted in Part III.B.1, the formal concept of stare decisis does not apply in civil-law 
systems. See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text. 
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Massachusetts could validly empower this highest court of 
Massachusetts to do so in the first place.91 
In the federal realm, the Constitution itself recognizes this 
principle with a simple, but subtly powerful, two-letter preposition: it 
vests in the federal Supreme Court “the judicial Power of the United 
States”—not, for example, “in” the United States.92 For this reason, 
even the Supreme Court lacks the authority to create precedent 
concerning the law of a state that is binding on the internal organs of 
that state.93 
Courts and scholars alike have almost entirely overlooked this 
essential jurisdictional premise of stare decisis. Nonetheless, a careful 
focus on this embedded limitation affords important insights into the 
values that animate the doctrine. One may properly speak of stability, 
predictability, and legitimacy from precedent precisely because a 
superior court—and ultimately a court of last instance—is able to 
speak with final authority on the law within its defined jurisdiction. It 
is this final authority, in other words, that creates and reinforces the 
value of “calm” at the foundation of stare decisis.94 
This consideration in turn requires fidelity in both the doctrine’s 
vertical and horizontal dimensions.95 When a polity constitutes 
inferior courts with the same jurisdiction,96 a functional concept of 
 
 91. Massachusetts courts may, of course, resolve disputes that involve the application of 
New York law. But any interpretation of New York law, although final in the dispute at hand, 
would not be binding on New York courts in the future. This is true notwithstanding the federal 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which was designed to mitigate the 
coordination problems associated with a federation of sovereign states. See Univ. of Tenn. v. 
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798–99 (1986) (“Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause is to act as a nationally unifying force . . . .” (quoting Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 
448 U.S. 261, 289 (1980) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271–72 (plurality opinion) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause ‘is 
one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of 
transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation.’” (quoting Sherrer 
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948))).  
 92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 93. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 387 (1986) (“[W]e have no 
authority to review state determinations of purely state law.”); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 
U.S. 223, 236 (1940) (“When [the highest court of the state] has spoken, its pronouncement is to 
be accepted by federal courts as defining state law . . . .”). 
 94. See supra note 16. 
 95. See Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1085–86 (2003) (examining these dimensions of stare decisis). 
 96. The term “jurisdiction” here does not necessarily connote a bounded geographical 
area. A particular polity may choose to have more than one “supreme” court, with jurisdiction 
delineated by subject matter. An example is Texas, which has a Supreme Court, but also has a 
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stare decisis requires that these courts be tied into a hierarchically 
integrated system with opportunities for oversight by superior courts. 
The great bulk of judging is done by lower courts. Vertical stare 
decisis thus especially serves the core values of system stability and 
predictability, for it is by this means that the precedents of superior 
courts have practical effect through mandatory adherence by inferior 
courts throughout the system. 
Horizontal stare decisis, by contrast, addresses the force of a 
precedent on the issuing court itself and thus has special significance 
for the value of judicial legitimacy.97 The requirement that even a 
supreme court identify compelling grounds before reexamining its 
own precedent reinforces the appearance of a principled, law-bound 
judiciary.98 Presumably, moreover, the most reliable judicial expertise 
on the internal law of a particular jurisdiction, as well as on the legal 
influence of subsequent developments, is housed in the jurisdiction’s 
own highest court. 
The ability of stare decisis to advance these values depends 
decisively on the power of precedent to control change. In a vertically 
integrated system protected by horizontal fidelity to precedent, 
systemic stability flows from the premise that all forces of legal 
change are endogenous to the system. Faithfully observed, stare 
decisis removes any incentives for corrosive relitigation of precedents 
and thus avoids the destabilizing effects of judicial reexamination.99 
Once a supreme judicial authority has established a precedent within 
its jurisdictional mandate, the only source of future legal change—
save permissible, prospective overrides by the legislature or other 
lawmaking institutions—should be the same court.100 It is for this 
reason that intervening developments in the law—the stare decisis 
 
Court of Criminal Appeals with “final appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the 
state, [the] determinations [of which] shall be final, in all criminal cases.” TEX. CONST. art. V, 
§§ 5–6.  
 97. See Murphy, supra note 95, at 1085–1101 (examining the historical foundations of the 
horizontal force of precedent); id. at 1116–26 (arguing that separation-of-powers principles 
preclude the courts from abandoning stare decisis as a constraint on their own discretion). 
 98. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 99. The constraint on reexamination by lower courts highlights the significance of scholarly 
analysis of the continuing validity of precedents. Because of stare decisis and other cultural and 
traditional forces, however, courts in the United States generally have not accorded substantial 
weight to scholarly arguments about particular precedents.  
 100. The one noteworthy exception is when Congress has delegated interpretive authority to 
an administrative agency for a particular statutory scheme. For more on this point, see infra 
notes 352–56 and accompanying text. 
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antivalue “of most relevance”101—commonly occur only through 
erosion at the edges of a precedent over a substantial period of 
time.102 
This perspective makes sense within the framework of a modern 
nation-state with an independent and hierarchically integrated 
judicial branch. The Supreme Court, as the ultimate repository of the 
federal judicial power, is able to speak with finality within the scope 
of federal law and thereby to control all forces of legal change within 
the domestic federal judicial system. As my analysis explores further, 
however, matters become considerably more opaque and complex 
when one reflexively extends the jurisdictional premises of stare 
decisis to a multipolar legal order. Such is the case with international 
law. In this realm, the reality of a multipolar system of judicial 
cooperation that entirely lacks hierarchical integration means that the 
international legal order has no means to create or maintain system-
wide uniformity.103 
To properly emphasize the implications of this fact, I first return 
to the Constitution’s core allocation of powers over foreign affairs. 
This foundation permits a deeper exploration of the special 
responsibilities of the judicial branch when international-law rights 
and obligations fall within its domestic power to declare the law—that 
is, when they fall within its “juris dictio.”104 
II.  SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The boundaries of the federal judicial power are nowhere more 
elusive and elastic than in the field of foreign affairs law. As a general 
proposition, the Constitution does not require a “hermetic division 
among the Branches,”105 nor does it require that “the three branches 
 
 101. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
 102. As already noted, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, one of the Court’s most 
prominent decisions of the early twenty-first century emphasizing the role of subsequent legal 
developments cited nearly one hundred years of erosion to justify overruling a precedent, see 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007) (“We have 
distanced ourselves from the [prior] opinion’s rationales. . . . [T]he case was decided not long 
after enactment of the Sherman Act . . . . Only eight years after [issuing the opinion], . . . the 
Court reined in the decision. . . .”).  
 103. See infra Part III.B. 
 104. See supra note 85.  
 105. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). 
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of Government ‘operate with absolute independence.’”106 
Nonetheless, as I demonstrate in this Part, the Constitution’s special 
arrangement of the “dispersed powers”107 of government in the field 
of foreign affairs creates even greater challenges for the “duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”108 
I begin in Section A with a review of the foundational allocations 
of authority over foreign affairs in the American constitutional 
structure. Section B then examines the institutional and prudential 
reasons for judicial caution in this important field. Section C 
concludes with a comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which 
the modern American legal system nonetheless channels foreign 
affairs matters, including fundamental issues of international law, to 
the federal courts. 
A. The Constitution’s Core Allocations of Authority in Foreign 
Affairs 
Although the Constitution’s general scheme of authority is well 
known, a reminder of the distinctive allocations of authority in 
foreign affairs provides a necessary foundation for the analysis to 
follow. The first principle is that Congress’s position as the 
preeminent domestic lawmaker extends to the field of foreign affairs 
as well. In addition to conveying a general grant of authority over 
foreign commerce,109 the Constitution delegates to Congress the 
specific powers “[t]o define and punish . . . Offences against the Law 
of Nations”110 and to declare and regulate private involvement in 
war.111 Moreover, the Necessary and Proper Clause112 generally 
empowers Congress to carry into execution any of the federal powers 
vested by the Constitution.113 This conferral of power includes, 
significantly, the exclusive authority to transform so-called non-self-
 
 106. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–94 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 707 (1974)). 
 107. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  
 108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 110. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 111. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”). 
 112. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 113. Id. 
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executing treaties into domestic law,114 even beyond the otherwise-
applicable limits on Congress’s Article I powers.115 The combined 
effect of these grants is that Congress has a virtually unlimited field 
within which to regulate the domestic-law incidents of foreign affairs, 
including through the incorporation of international-law norms into 
the domestic sphere.116 
The more prominent challenge for the work of the judiciary in 
foreign affairs arises from the special delegations to the president in 
the field. Article II, Section 1 generally vests in the president “[t]he 
executive Power,”117 a term that itself has generated substantial 
scholarly debate.118 But the Constitution also specifically designates 
the president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces119 and 
confers on him broad authority over ambassadorial relations.120 These 
express delegations have led to the recognition of certain 
independent powers of the president in foreign affairs,121 as well as a 
general presidential authority to manage routine external legal 
relations with foreign states.122 
Of more significance for immediate purposes is the special role 
of the president in the creation of domestic law founded on sovereign 
 
 114. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (“The responsibility for 
transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic 
law falls to Congress.”). For more on the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties, see infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–34 (1920) (“If the treaty is valid there can be 
no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means 
to execute the powers of the Government.”). 
 116. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 66 
(2d ed. 1996) (concluding, after reviewing Supreme Court precedent on the foreign-commerce 
power, that that power “might be sufficient to support virtually any legislation that relates to 
foreign commerce, i.e., to foreign relations”).  
 117. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 118. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as 
Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, 
The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).  
 119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 120. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the president the power, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, to “appoint Ambassadors . . . and Consuls”); id. art. II, § 3 (conferring authority on 
the president to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”). 
 121. Prominent among these powers are the power to recognize foreign governments, see, 
e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 212 (1962), and the power to direct the tactical aspects of external military conflicts, see, 
e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 
615 (1850). 
 122. For more on this point, see infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
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commitments under international law. Article II, Section 2 empowers 
the president to “make Treaties,” provided two-thirds of the senators 
present concur.123 The Supreme Court also has endorsed a unilateral 
executive power to conclude binding international legal agreements, 
in some cases with domestic-law effects—effects I consider in Section 
C124—and has not required compliance with the constitutionally 
prescribed procedures for the approval of treaties.125 Finally, the 
president’s position as the country’s “constitutional representative” in 
foreign affairs126 affords him substantial authority, in the external 
realm, over the acceptance of norms of customary international law 
on behalf of the United States.127 
The legal norms created by the political branches that regulate 
foreign affairs, like any other form of federal law, may fall within the 
enforcement authority of federal courts. In parallel with 
corresponding clauses for the legislative and executive powers, 
Article III, Section 1 “vest[s]” the judicial power of the United States 
in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may 
establish.128 Offering no textual differentiation, Section 2 of the same 
article then defines the judicial power to include “all Cases” arising 
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.129 The 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI likewise includes treaties within the 
scope of the “supreme Law of the Land.”130 The inclusion of treaties 
 
 123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 124. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (recognizing such a power); 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) (“[T]he President does have some measure 
of power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of the 
Senate . . . .”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“[A]n international 
compact . . . is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate.”).  
 126. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting S. COMM. 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 14TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REP. OF FEBRUARY 15, 1816, reprinted in S. 
DOC. NO. 56-231, pt. 6, at 19, 21 (1901)). 
 127. See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (declaring that “in foreign affairs the President has 
a degree of independent authority to act”); Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 320 
(observing that in foreign affairs, the president has “a degree of discretion and freedom from 
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved”). In 
more practical terms, the president controls the expression of consent through the formal 
representatives of the United States in a variety of international organizations, including the 
United Nations, see, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 287 (2006) (authorizing the president to appoint 
representatives to the United Nations), nearly all of whom participate in creating norms of 
international law.  
 128. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 129. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 130. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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in these parallel lists has obvious significance for my analysis. Also of 
note, Article III expressly extends the federal judicial power to cases 
involving ambassadors and similar matters that carry special foreign 
affairs sensitivities.131 
Article III’s description of federal judicial authority nonetheless 
draws no distinction between foreign affairs and any other category of 
cases. Even the traditional judicial concerns over federalism 
constraints on national power wither to near insignificance in foreign 
affairs.132 Moreover, as underscored by federal judges’ Article VI oath 
“to support th[e] Constitution,”133 nothing in the Constitution requires 
or permits judges to refuse either “to render dispositive judgments”134 
in foreign affairs disputes properly before them or to resolve disputed 
issues of law in the process.135 As the Supreme Court thus observed in 
a 1990 opinion with immediate foreign-policy implications, “Courts in 
the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to 
decide cases and controversies properly presented to them.”136 
B. Judicial Reticence, Judicial Deference 
Nonetheless, the federal courts’ opinions at times have reflected 
a lack of judicial self-esteem in the field of foreign affairs. The judicial 
branch, of course, has no authority to conduct or oversee the foreign 
policy of the United States. But occasional judicial rhetoric has 
suggested that, even in actual cases and controversies properly before 
 
 131. Id. art. III, § 2 (extending the judicial power to cases affecting “Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls,” “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,” and 
controversies between states or citizens “and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”).  
 132. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (“[F]oreign affairs and 
international relations [are] matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal 
Government . . . .”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (making the same 
point and declaring that the Constitution “speaks with no uncertain sound upon this subject”). 
To emphasize the point, the Constitution also expressly prohibits the states—in a departure 
from the default assumption of mostly concurrent lawmaking powers—from entering into any 
formal foreign affairs obligations on their own. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation . . . .”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting the 
states from concluding “any Agreement or Compact with . . . a foreign Power” without the 
consent of Congress).  
 133. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 134. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (declaring that “a ‘judicial 
Power’ is one to render dispositive judgments” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential 
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 135. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 323 
(2007) (making a similar point based on Article VI’s required oath to support the Constitution).  
 136. W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990). 
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them, the courts generally believe that they lack the competence to 
question the judgments of the political branches in the field of foreign 
affairs. Thus, as the Supreme Court declared in Regan v. Wald137—to 
choose just one example of the many “sweeping statements”138 to this 
effect—“Matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are 
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to 
be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.’”139 
Such rhetorical flights have provoked excited scholarly debates 
that continue to this day.140 Baker v. Carr141—certainly the most 
significant modern opinion on the political question doctrine—put to 
rest the extreme notion that every case with foreign-policy 
implications falls outside judicial cognizance.142 Moreover, no majority 
opinion of the Supreme Court has actually applied the formal 
political question doctrine to justify abstention in a foreign affairs 
case,143 although several opinions have acknowledged the targeted 
constitutional powers distinctly delegated to the other branches.144 
 
 137. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). 
 138. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“There are sweeping statements to the 
effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions.”). 
 139. Regan, 468 U.S. at 242 (omission in original) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 589 (1952)); see also Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The 
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the 
Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the Government, and the propriety 
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or 
decision.”). 
 140. For comprehensive treatments of the subject, see generally THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 
1996); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); and JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: 
THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005). 
 141. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 142. See id. at 211 (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”). The Court reiterated the point two years 
later in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See id. at 423 (“[I]t cannot of 
course be thought that ‘every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
judicial cognizance.’” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211)). 
 143. What Professor Louis Henkin said in 1996 remains true: “There is . . . no Supreme 
Court precedent for extraordinary abstention from judicial review in foreign affairs cases.” 
HENKIN, supra note 116, at 146; cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–04 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing, in an opinion joined by three other Justices, that the issue 
of termination of a treaty by the president is “nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of 
the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the 
Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President”). 
 144. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (recognizing the power 
of the president to recognize foreign governments); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 
610, 634–35 (1818) (observing that an executive determination on the legal status of a foreign 
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And although the number of lower court abstention opinions is not 
insignificant, all of these opinions have addressed specific disputes 
over the constitutional allocation of powers in the field.145 
These engagements with the political question doctrine are 
reflective of a primitive judicial sense that something is qualitatively 
different when courts are called on to apply foreign affairs law. 
Justice Sutherland’s description of foreign affairs in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.146 as a “vast external realm, 
with . . . important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems”147 
continues to resonate in modern opinions. Indeed, Baker v. Carr itself 
sketched the reasons for a special judicial modesty in this context. 
Even aside from formal constitutional commitments to another 
branch, the Court has observed that the resolution of issues in the 
field “frequently turn[s] on standards that defy judicial application” 
or that “uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the 
Government’s views.”148 More generally, the Court’s opinions have 
emphasized the inability of courts to gauge the precise implications of 
their decisions for the delicate subject of foreign relations.149 
For reasons institutional and prudential, the primary beneficiary 
of these judicial sentiments has been the executive branch. Time and 
again, federal court opinions have expressed respect for the 
 
conflict under international law “transcend[s] the limits prescribed to the judicial department”). 
For a comprehensive analysis of this issue from a textual perspective, see RAMSEY, supra note 
135, at 155–73; and Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 118, at 264–65. 
 145. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 558–62 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to sit 
in judgment on the president’s conduct of war); Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 
F.3d 1300, 1311–20 (11th Cir. 2001) (addressing the approval of treaties by an act of Congress); 
Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109, 1109–11 (10th Cir. 1977) (addressing the power of the president 
to return cultural property by executive agreement); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337–41 
(D.D.C. 1987) (addressing the president’s power to initiate hostilities). 
 146. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) 
 147. Id. at 319.  
 148. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also id. at 217 (citing the influence of “an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question”). 
 149. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. But concerns about offending foreign states 
have not led the Court to shrink from its judicial responsibilities when it determines that the law 
is clear, as two prominent decisions on treaty law have demonstrated. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 
S. Ct. 1346, 1360 (2008) (refusing to enforce the judgment of the ICJ as domestic law because 
doing so would “undermin[e] the ability of the political branches to determine whether and how 
to comply with an ICJ judgment”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352–53 (2006) 
(affirming a procedural-default judgment despite the ICJ’s determination that procedural 
defaults do not apply to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 
17). 
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president’s independent authority to act in the field and for his “vast 
share of responsibility”150 for the nation’s relations with foreign 
states.151 Derivative of this sense of respect has been a judicial 
recognition, at least in a comparative sense, of the executive’s 
superior expertise and access to reliable information on such issues.152 
In light of the executive branch’s institutional advantages—especially 
its ability to consider broader perspectives and to act with secrecy and 
dispatch—sound reasons support the courts’ perspective. Moreover, 
as a practical matter, the president’s ability to take the lead—to give 
solemn assurances to foreign states and to pursue paths of action 
founded on autonomous interpretations of the law—may work to 
constrain future judicial reexamination.153 As I show in more detail in 
Part III.C.3,154 this perspective also has been condensed into formal 
doctrines that grant deference to the executive branch’s views on the 
very content of the law. 
In spite of these realities, the field for judicial action in foreign 
affairs matters, as demonstrated in the next Section, is considerable 
and expanding. A full appreciation of the breadth of this engagement 
highlights the significance of establishing inflexible precedents when 
the judiciary unavoidably participates in defining the content of 
America’s foreign affairs law. 
 
 150. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  
 151. See, e.g., id. (“[I]n foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to 
act.”); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (observing that the president 
has “unique responsibility” for the conduct of “foreign and military affairs”); Chi. & S. Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (“The President . . . possesses in his 
own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as 
the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (“[W]hen it 
comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [the area of national security and 
foreign relations], ‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked,’ and respect for 
the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.” (citation omitted) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981))); Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (accepting an executive 
treaty interpretation on the ground that “[t]he Executive is well informed concerning the 
diplomatic consequences resulting from this Court’s interpretation” of a treaty, “including the 
likely reaction of other contracting states”); see also supra note 1. 
 153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 326(1) (1987) (stating that the president has the authority to interpret treaties 
“asserted by the United States in its relations with [foreign] states”). 
 154. See infra notes 340–45 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Significant and Expanding Judicial Responsibilities in Foreign 
Affairs Lawmaking 
In this Section, I refine my discussion to focus on those aspects of 
foreign affairs law that raise special concerns regarding the force of 
stare decisis. I have noted that constitutional decisions on foreign 
affairs powers are already subject to a weakened form of the 
doctrine.155 By contrast, and for reasons that will become clearer in 
this Section,156 judicial application of foreign affairs statutes—and 
derivative administrative regulations—does not require the same 
compromise of the prudential and institutional values at the 
foundation of stare decisis. To illustrate this distinction, however, I 
must first identify the special category of controversies that fall within 
the Article III “judicial Power” of the federal courts and that directly 
or indirectly involve those courts in the very definition of the nation’s 
rights and obligations under international law. 
It is no secret, even for the casual observer of public affairs, that 
international law and institutions have played an increasingly 
prominent role in the modern law of the United States. Treaty 
regimes have proliferated, international institutions have grown in 
both number and range of authority, and references to international-
law norms in domestic litigation have become commonplace.157 The 
mandate of the judicial branch does not extend to purely sovereign-
to-sovereign legal disputes, a point Chief Justice Marshall emphasized 
early in America’s constitutional history.158 But international law now 
also makes increasing claims to issues in the domestic space. It is 
precisely because of this development that the authority of the 
 
 155. It is this confined, though significant, subset of issues to which Professor Michael 
Ramsey refers with his observation that “[f]oreign affairs law is, at its root, constitutional law.” 
RAMSEY, supra note 135, at 1. 
 156. See infra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. 
 157. Thus, for example, one list published by the U.S. Department of State lists many 
thousands of treaties and other international agreements. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES 
IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/169274.pdf. In addition, a search in the Westlaw database for federal court 
opinions reveals more than ten thousand references to “treaty” or “international law” in the 
years from 2001 to 2011.  
 158. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829) (“The judiciary is not that 
department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is 
confided . . . .”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 
(1833); see also United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 711 (1832) (endorsing this 
quotation).  
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judiciary to resort to international norms as rules of decision is among 
the most controversial issues in modern legal scholarship.159 
Although my allusion to the debate offers some flavor for the 
sensitivity of the subject, I need not wade into the controversy in this 
Article. My concern is instead the product of judicial action, 
regardless of how domestic law has empowered the courts to resolve 
disputes by reference to international-law sources. My analysis 
begins, in other words, with international legal norms that have 
already been validated through domestic recognition mechanisms—
whether those mechanisms be the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 
the United States. 
These norms share five essential characteristics: (1) they have 
come into being through international lawmaking processes, and thus 
their substance derives in whole or in part from international law; 
(2) they affect legal rights or obligations; (3) they have been validated 
as domestic law through domestic recognition mechanisms; (4) they 
fall within the authority of domestic courts to determine through 
binding pronouncements; and (5) they are enforceable through 
domestic legal sanctions.160 When these five characteristics are 
present, the Article III judicial power extends to the enforcement of 
international-law rights and obligations in domestic law and thus to 
the creation of precedents in the process. 
International law comes in two principal forms: treaties and 
customary international law.161 Although both create formal 
obligations as a matter of international law,162 disputes about the 
circumstances in which the courts may enforce these forms of 
international law in our domestic legal system have existed since the 
 
 159. See supra note 4. 
 160. I acknowledge an intellectual debt here to the thoughtful analysis by Professors Robert 
Scott and Paul Stephan on the general concept of the “formal enforcement” of international 
law. See SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 5, at 4, 9–16 (using “the term formal enforcement to 
distinguish legalized, institutionally based, privately initiated mechanisms from the traditional 
informal means of enforcement that remain subject to state control”).  
 161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(1) (1987) (“A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by 
the international community of states (a) in the form of customary law [or] (b) by international 
agreement . . . .”).  
 162. See id. § 102(2) (stating that binding rules of customary international law arise “from a 
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”); id. 
§ 102(3) (“International agreements create law for the states parties thereto . . . .”). 
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founding of the Republic.163 But what has not yet been fully 
appreciated is the multiplicity of avenues by which the modern 
American legal system formally channels norms of international law 
into the domestic courts. My goal in the paragraphs that follow is to 
canvass these avenues and thereby to highlight the broad and 
expanding field of unavoidable judicial involvement in foreign affairs 
lawmaking. 
The classic example of judicially enforceable international law164 
is a self-executing treaty—that is, a treaty that “operates of itself” as 
domestic law.165 To pick just one illustration, the United States has, 
since its founding, concluded treaties of “amity, commerce and 
navigation,”166 the very purpose of which is to create reciprocal 
property and procedural rights for foreign citizens that are 
enforceable in domestic courts.167 Because such treaties are supreme 
law under Article VI,168 the courts have an “obligation” to enforce 
them as preemptive federal law.169 And because of those treaties’ 
sheer number and substantive subject matters, the scope of this 
 
 163. See Kimi Lynn King & James Meernik, The Supreme Court and the Powers of the 
Executive: The Adjudication of Foreign Policy, 52 POL. RES. Q. 801, 802, 808–09 (1999) 
(purporting to survey all of the Supreme Court cases in history, although with quite limited 
search terms, and concluding “that the Supreme Court has often issued decisions where there 
are American foreign policy concerns”); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial 
Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE 
L.J. 855, 861 (2005) (examining “every foreign affairs case on the [Supreme] Court’s docket 
from 1791 to 1835” and concluding that foreign affairs matters were part of “the day-to-day 
business of the Court”).  
 164. Cf. John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1176–77 (2007) (employing the term “domesticated international law,” but 
only in the narrower sense of norms that “our political branches have expressly made part of 
our law through the legislative process”).  
 165. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 166. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 
U.S.T. 138; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 U.S.T. 
116. 
 167. Cf. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1365 (“[W]e have held that a number of the ‘Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation’ Treaties . . . are self-executing . . . .” (citation omitted)); McKesson 
Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that the Treaty of 
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, “like 
other treaties of its kind, is self-executing”). 
 168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 169. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (observing that self-executing treaty provisions 
have “the force and effect of a legislative enactment” (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 
190, 194 (1888)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (holding that because a treaty is the law of the land, “its obligation on 
the courts of the United States must be admitted”).  
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judicial obligation is broad indeed: the list of self-executing treaties 
ratified by the United States now certainly exceeds five hundred.170 
But treaties may fall within judicial cognizance by other means as 
well. That is, even non-self-executing treaties may have force as 
domestic law through congressional adoption of “treaty-statutes,”171 
whether through wholesale legislative transformation,172 targeted 
incorporation—of which dozens of examples exist173—or so-called ex 
post congressional-executive agreements.174 
 
 170. Unfortunately, the State Department does not keep separate records for self-executing 
treaties. My own research has confirmed that over five hundred exist. See Michael P. Van 
Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 921–23 (2004) 
(“The number of treaties that contain self-executing provisions is now over four hundred (even 
excluding treaties with Native American tribes).” (footnote omitted)); Michael P. Van Alstine, 
Self-Executing Treaties List (2004 and Before) (2004) (unpublished research) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). Contrary to popular perception, the Bush administration was particularly 
active on this score: in eight short years it oversaw the ratification of over one hundred self-
executing treaties and related protocols. Michael P. Van Alstine, List of Treaties Approved 
During Bush Administration that Are or Likely Are Self-Executing (2009) (unpublished 
research) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 171. For an article that develops a framework for understanding how Congress uses 
language and concepts from treaties in domestic legislation, see John F. Coyle, Incorporative 
Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655 (2010).  
 172. Prominent examples include the acts implementing the U.N. Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 3, see 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006), the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 97-12, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 (1986), 
see 9 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (1983), see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11601(b)(1) (2006), and the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10, see Cape 
Town Treaty Implementation Act of 2004, 49 U.S.C. § 44101 (2006).  
 173. In this vein, Congress has often expressly referred to treaties to supplement or limit 
legislation or to delegate implementation authority to executive agencies. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 
§ 802 (2006) (providing that the Uniform Code of Military Justice applies to any person 
“[s]ubject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party”); 16 
U.S.C. § 1435(a) (2006) (requiring regulations on national marine sanctuaries to comply “with 
treaties, conventions, and other agreements to which the United States is a party”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 957 (2006) (providing criminal sanctions for any person who “knowingly and willfully 
possesses or controls any property or papers used or designed or intended for use in 
violating . . . rights or obligations of the United States under any treaty”); Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-227, div. G, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 
2681-822 to -823 (empowering the “appropriate agencies” to adopt regulations to implement 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1987)); Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-228, § 2, 105 Stat. 1691, 
1691–93 (“The authorities provided in this chapter shall be exercised consistent with the 
obligation incurred by the United States in connection with the CFE Treaty.”); see also Michael 
P. Van Alstine, List of Statutory Incorporations of the “Law of Nations” or “International Law” 
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The enforcement of customary international law by federal 
courts is a more controversial subject.175 As a general matter, the 
Supreme Court has only endorsed federal common-lawmaking for 
certain narrow “enclaves” of “uniquely federal interest.”176 One 
prime—though hotly contested—example of an enclave, however, is 
the federal common law of foreign affairs.177 The Court itself 
reinvigorated controversy on this score in 2006 with its rhetoric about 
“international law cum common law” in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.178 
In the face of spirited scholarly debates,179 the Sosa Court reaffirmed 
that “the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of 
nations.”180 Again, however, I need not engage here with the details of 
 
(2012) (unpublished research) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing a comprehensive 
list of such legislative references to treaties). 
 174. Congressional executive agreements reflect legislative approval of a treaty through 
standard Article I legislation, not through the Article II treaty process. In such cases, however, 
Congress has commonly adopted comprehensive legislation that is so dense as to preclude 
resorting to the treaty for substantive interpretive material. One example is the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, which includes a 
declaration that its provisions alone “satisfy the obligations of the United States [under the 
Convention]” and that “no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that 
purpose,” id. § 2(3), 102 Stat. at 2853; see also North American Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1) (2006) (“No provision of the Agreement, nor the 
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent with any 
law of the United States shall have effect.”); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3512(a)(1) (2006) (“No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the 
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any 
law of the United States shall have effect.”). 
 175. See supra note 4. 
 176. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426–27 (1964); see also Boyle v. 
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“But we have held that a few areas . . . are so 
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is 
pre-empted and replaced . . . by federal law of a content prescribed . . . by the courts—so-called 
‘federal common law.’”); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) 
(“[T]he Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what 
has come to be known as ‘federal common law.’” (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 
332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947))); Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 307 (“Hence, although federal judicial 
power to deal with common-law problems was cut down [by the Erie doctrine], that power 
remained unimpaired for dealing independently, wherever necessary or appropriate, with 
essentially federal matters . . . .”). 
 177. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 640 (declaring that federal common law governs 
“international disputes implicating . . . [American] relations with foreign nations”). 
 178. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); id. at 712. 
 179. See supra note 4.  
 180. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30. The Court further noted that “[i]nternational law is part of 
[American] law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of 
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
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this contentious debate. It will suffice to observe that, at least in some 
circumstances, the federal courts are empowered to enforce uniform 
federal rules founded in international law—solely on their own 
authority, if necessary.181 
In any event, a far more common source of authority for judicial 
enforcement of customary international law is a delegation from 
Congress.182 Early in America’s constitutional history, the Supreme 
Court endorsed Congress’s power to delegate discretionary authority 
to the courts.183 And since then, Congress has done so with great 
frequency. Well over one hundred legislative provisions describe 
rights or obligations, or otherwise define legal norms, through an 
incorporation of “the law of nations” or “international law.”184 The 
 
their determination.” Id. at 730 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 181. See id. (concluding that the “door” for judicial enforcement of international law 
remains “open to a narrow class of international norms today”); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423 
(“[I]t is, of course, true that United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in 
appropriate circumstances . . . .”). 
 182. The proper place of maritime and admiralty law in this analysis poses special 
challenges. The Supreme Court has long reasoned that Article III’s express inclusion of those 
matters in “the judicial Power” impliedly empowers the federal courts “to draw on the 
substantive law ‘inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction’ and to continue the 
development of this law within constitutional limits.” Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 
358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (citation omitted) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932)). 
In some early cases, the Court referred extensively to “the law of nations” in fulfilling this 
responsibility. See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159 (1795) (relying on the “law of 
nations” as part of the Court’s reasoning); Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 9 (1794) 
(“[B]y the law of nations, the courts of the captor can alone determine the question of 
prize . . . .”). Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, Congress additionally granted to 
the federal district courts original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime 
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). Congress also included a savings clause that permitted 
such cases also to proceed in state courts under state law. Id. As a result, maritime and 
admiralty law reflects an amalgam of state and federal law. It is, to be sure, also informed by 
international law, but it does not derive its content directly from that source. 
 183. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (upholding a conviction 
under a congressional act that criminalized piracy “as defined by the law of nations” against a 
claim that Congress could not leave the matter to judicial interpretation); United States v. 
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 632 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[W]hen Congress enacts a statute that 
expressly incorporates customary international law into the domestic law of the United States, 
the federal courts are required, as with any other constitutional congressional mandate, to 
follow the statutory language adopted by Congress and apply customary international law.”). 
 184. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006) (reserving the right of the military to try offenses that 
“by . . . the law of war” may be tried by military commissions); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) 
(criminalizing piracy “as defined by the law of nations”); 22 U.S.C. § 462 (2006) (empowering 
the president to detain foreign vessels at American ports when permitted “by the law of 
nations”); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006) (providing that a foreign state will not be immune from 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts when “rights of property taken in violation of international 
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most controversial of these provisions is the Alien Tort Statute,185 
which the Supreme Court found in Sosa to contain an implied 
delegation of authority to the courts to recognize tort claims—
especially human-rights tort claims—that allege violations of 
international law.186 A variety of derivative administrative 
regulations187 and executive orders188 contain similar incorporations of 
international law. In all such cases, the identification of the governing 
norms of international law falls to the federal courts. 
The authority for judicial enforcement of international law also 
may come solely in the form of executive agreements.189 Such 
agreements, made entirely on the basis of the executive’s independent 
powers under the Constitution, may have limited domestic legal 
effects.190 A much more significant field of operation for executive 
agreements, however, results from delegations of authority by 
Congress. Indeed, Professor Oona Hathaway estimates that between 
1990 and 2000 alone, the executive branch concluded over 1300 
 
law are in issue”); see also Van Alstine, supra note 173 (surveying these legislative 
incorporations). 
 185. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (granting to the district courts “original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States”). 
 186. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (“The First Congress, which 
reflected the understanding of the framing generation and included some of the Framers, 
assumed that federal courts could properly identify some international norms as enforceable in 
the exercise of § 1350 jurisdiction.”). 
 187. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 922.4 (2011) (providing that regulations implementing a National 
Marine Sanctuary designation “shall be applied in accordance with generally recognized 
principles of international law”); 32 C.F.R. § 153.5(b) (2011) (requiring that military 
investigations of civilians in foreign countries “shall be conducted in accordance 
with . . . applicable international law”); 33 C.F.R. § 160.107 (2011) (providing that Coast Guard 
port authorities may deny entry to certain vessels “subject to recognized principles of 
international law”).  
 188. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,178 § 11(a), 65 Fed. Reg. 76,903, 76,910 (Dec. 7, 2000), 
reprinted as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 6401 app. at 1057, 1061 (2006) (requiring that an ecosystem 
reserve be managed “in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”); 
Exec. Order No. 10,637 § 1(m), 20 Fed. Reg. 7025, 7027 (Sept. 20, 1955), reprinted as amended in 
3 U.S.C. § 301 app. at 617, 618 (2006) (empowering the secretary of homeland security to 
withhold clearance for any vessel believed to be carrying weapons “in violation of the laws, 
treaties, or obligations of the United States under the law of nations”).  
 189. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive review of the subject, 
see generally Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 
(2007). 
 190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 303(4) (1987) (stating that the president may make a sole executive agreement 
“dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution”).  
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executive agreements pursuant to formal legislative delegations.191 
Thus, for example, in 2000, President Clinton concluded executive 
agreements with Germany, Austria, and France to address lingering 
private claims from the Second World War.192 Beyond these formal 
examples, the Supreme Court has recognized a parallel executive 
power if supported by a “‘particularly longstanding practice’ of 
congressional acquiescence.”193 
A final method by which federal courts recognize the 
international legal obligations of the United States is an indirect one. 
Through a variety of interpretive presumptions, the courts have given 
effect to international legal norms not otherwise recognized through 
more formal mechanisms. The most prominent among this group is 
the general presumption that when Congress adopts domestic 
legislation, it intends to abide by international law.194 A parallel 
presumption operates to protect international norms contained in 
treaties195 and executive agreements.196 Each of these metarules of 
 
 191. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 
119 YALE L.J. 140, 155–65 & n.29 (2009) (“Between 1990 and 2000, for example, approximately 
twenty percent of [the 1747 total executive agreements concluded] were sole executive 
agreements. The remaining eighty percent [or 1300 executive agreements] were congressional 
executive agreements.”).  
 192. See Agreement Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War 
II, U.S.-Fr., Jan. 18, 2001, Temp. State Dep’t No. 01-36, 2001 WL 416465; Agreement 
Concerning the Austrian Fund “Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation,” U.S.-Austria, Oct. 24, 
2000, 40 I.L.M. 523 (2001); Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, 
Responsibility and the Future,” U.S.-Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298. For a review of the 
history of these agreements, see American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 402–09 
(2003). 
 193. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352 (2008) (quoting Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415).  
 194. The rule traces its lineage to Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 
(1804); id. at 118 (“It has also been observed than an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”); see also 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (observing that 
“principles of customary international law” reflect “law that (we must assume) Congress 
ordinarily seeks to follow”). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and 
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 
517–24 (1998) (questioning the legislative-intent and internationalist conceptions behind the 
Charming Betsy canon). See generally Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Revisited, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61 
(2007) (examining whether this presumption should extend to constitutional interpretation). 
 195. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1995) 
(“[A] concern [for judicial interference with international agreements] counsels against 
construing [the treaty] to nullify foreign arbitration clauses because of inconvenience to the 
plaintiff or insular distrust of the ability of foreign arbitrators to apply the law.”); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (“There is, first, a firm and 
obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous 
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interpretation necessarily involves a primary judicial determination of 
the content of international law. That is, each protective presumption 
first requires a court to identify the international legal norms with 
which ambiguous domestic law might conflict. 
To be sure, the constitutional requirement of domestic 
recognition creates a discrete moment when domestic lawmaking 
institutions can filter the content of international law. In nearly all 
such moments thus far, however, the lawmaking institutions have 
merely given their blanket assent, whether ex post or ex ante, to the 
enforcement of international-law norms in domestic law.197 The 
infrequency of controversies over the significance of preratification 
Senate treaty debates illustrates this point.198 What remains is 
substantial judicial agency, and thus leadership, over the 
identification of the very content of the nation’s legal obligations 
under international law. 
III.  EXAMINING THE COMPLICATED ROLE OF STARE DECISIS IN 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The striking fact from my analyses of foreign affairs and stare 
decisis is how little they seem to have in common. Accepted doctrine 
reflexively accords judicial decisions in foreign affairs the same stare 
decisis force as any prosaic form of domestic law. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the sheer volume of opportunities, the Supreme 
Court has never seriously examined the proper role of stare decisis 
 
congressional action.”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A treaty will not be 
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part 
of Congress has been clearly expressed.”). 
 196. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (applying the presumption in favor of 
an executive agreement). 
 197. The Senate is free, of course, to condition its consent on a formal amendment of the 
treaty’s text or otherwise to attach reservations, understandings, or declarations (RUDs). Doing 
so is now a common practice during the Senate’s ratification of human-rights treaties when the 
Senate considers the binary question of self-execution. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 402 
(2000) (examining and defending the use of RUDs). In such a case, however, the treaty partners 
have the right to object and refuse renegotiation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
arts. 19–21, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336–37 (1980) (defining the 
rules of international law on this subject). 
 198. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 367 n. 7 (1989) (sanctioning the use of such 
materials). But see id. at 373–74 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting resort to such materials 
because “[t]he question before [the Court] in a treaty case is what the two or more sovereigns 
agreed to, rather than what a single one of them, or the legislature of a single one of them, 
thought it agreed to”).  
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when a court creates a precedent in foreign affairs, even a precedent 
involving the rules that govern the nation’s formal legal relations with 
foreign states under international law.199 This Part argues that such an 
examination is long overdue. 
Section A first establishes the context with a review of why 
substantially more is at stake in matters of international law than in 
matters of purely domestic law. Section B demonstrates that even the 
basic premises of stare decisis may become compromised when courts 
create precedent on international law. Section C then explores the 
institutional perspective, specifically the fact and impropriety of 
judicial leadership in this sensitive field. I then pull the threads 
together in Part IV with an argument not only in favor of a more 
nuanced understanding of stare decisis for international-law 
precedents but also in favor of the existing regime of stare decisis for 
precedents involving purely domestic law. 
A. The Special Responsibility of the Judicial Station 
International legal norms differ importantly in both process and 
product from law of a purely domestic origin. By their very nature, 
international norms reflect formal rights or obligations under 
international law and thus function as elements of that independent, 
external legal regime. Yet disputes involving international law, as 
discussed, may also “arise under” federal law and may thus fall within 
the domestic enforcement authority of federal courts.200 
The archetype of this duality is a treaty. A treaty is first and 
fundamentally a product of international law.201 Its primary function is 
to create reciprocal legal obligations among sovereign states.202 And 
because treaty obligations are elements of an independent, external 
 
 199. As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court has only rarely even paused to 
mention the force of precedent in such cases. See supra note 6. 
 200. See supra Part II.C. For an introduction to this abstract debate over dualism versus 
monism, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the 
Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999); and Melissa A. Waters, Creeping 
Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007). 
 201. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
at 339 (declaring as a core principle that agreements between states reflect binding obligations); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 321 
(1987) (same). 
 202. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (declaring that a treaty is 
“primarily a compact between independent nations” (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 
580, 598 (1884)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2012  8:15 PM 
982 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:941 
legal regime, the breach of these obligations may occasion 
international discord, including various forms of tangible 
retribution.203 But under the combined force of Articles III and VI,204 
the U.S. Constitution also permits “self-executing” treaties to fulfill 
the dual functions of international legal obligation and judicially 
enforceable domestic law.205 
Even in the case of self-executing treaties, however, the second 
function operates on the foundation—and against the interpretive 
backdrop—of the first. The Supreme Court thus long ago recognized 
that even the domestic-law incidents of a treaty depend on the formal 
legal acts required for the treaty’s entry into force under international 
law.206 The substantive content of a treaty similarly is derived from its 
international origins. Treaty jurisprudence acknowledges this point 
through a web of related interpretive principles.207 Thus, the 
understandings and practices of international law, not “any artificial 
or special sense impressed . . . by local law,” provide the interpretive 
background.208 Moreover, the ultimate responsibility of a court is “to 
 
 203. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 60, 1155 
U.N.T.S. at 346 (setting forth the right of states to terminate a treaty for material breach by a 
member state); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598 (observing that if “the interest and the 
honor of the governments which are parties to [a treaty] . . . . fail, its infraction becomes the 
subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to 
seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war”).  
 204. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 205. See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (“[A] treaty 
ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land but also an agreement among 
sovereign powers . . . .” (citation omitted)); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty 
Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 157–59 (emphasizing the dual nature of treaties); David H. 
Moore, Essay, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: Equivalence, Duality, and Non-
Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2246–48 (2010) (noting that the dual nature of 
treaties justifies self-execution). For a comprehensive comparative study of this subject, see 
generally THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009). 
 206. See Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 230 (1901) (holding that the treaty in 
question did not “take effect upon individual rights, until there was an exchange of 
ratifications”); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 34 (1869) (holding that the force of a treaty 
under domestic law depends on the formal international-law act of the exchange of instruments 
of ratification). 
 207. Like all such inquiries, the interpretation of a treaty “begins with its text.” Abbott v. 
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010) (quoting Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
 208. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); see also United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 
(7 Pet.) 51, 86–87 (1833) (interpreting a treaty against the backdrop of the “modern usage of 
nations”); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 246 (1817) (“[T]he language of the law of 
nations . . . is always to be consulted in the interpretation of treaties.”). 
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read [a] treaty in a manner ‘consistent with the shared expectations of 
the contracting parties’”209 precisely because a treaty reflects agreed 
commitments among sovereigns under international law. 
This “shared” aspect carries important implications for the work 
of the federal courts. First, and tellingly, the proper sources of 
interpretive material are the international negotiating and drafting 
records—the so-called travaux préparatoires.210 Evidence of shared 
original intent likewise may be found in the “practical construction” 
of the treaty parties through their course of conduct post-
ratification.211 Moreover, a prime aim of judicial enforcement of a 
treaty is uniformity of interpretation by the parties’ respective 
domestic courts.212 To secure this goal, the Supreme Court has 
consistently emphasized that “[t]he ‘opinions of our sister 
signatories’ . . . are ‘entitled to considerable weight.’”213 
 
 209. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 
392, 399 (1985)); see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) 
(observing that in interpreting a treaty, a court’s “role is limited to giving effect to the intent of 
theTreaty [sic] parties”).  
  210. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is 
‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids to its interpretation’ 
the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty . . . .” (quoting Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 226)). 
 211. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 396); see 
also O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986) (“The course of conduct of parties to an 
international agreement . . . is evidence of its meaning.”). 
 212. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1991 (emphasizing that in interpreting a treaty, a “uniform, 
text-based approach ensures international consistency”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 
331, 383 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “uniformity is an important goal of treaty 
interpretation”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 325 cmt. d (1987) (“Treaties that lay down rules to be enforced by the parties through 
their internal courts or administrative agencies should be construed so as to achieve uniformity 
of result despite differences between national legal systems.”).  
 213. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting El Al Isr. 
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also E. Airlines, 499 U.S. at 550–51 (noting that the Court “must also consult the opinions of 
[its] sister signatories” when determining the meaning of a treaty). See generally Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 579–81 (2004) 
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004), in 
which the majority and dissent applied El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 
155 (1999), and arrived at opposite conclusions). The Supreme Court has, on occasion, also cited 
subsequent developments in other maritime nations as grounds for overruling admiralty 
precedents. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 397–98 (1975) (observing, 
in connection with the overruling of an earlier admiralty rule, that “[t]he courts of every major 
maritime nation except [the United States] have long since abandoned th[e] rule”); Moragne v. 
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1970) (citing subsequent judicial and legislative 
developments in England as one ground for overruling a longstanding rule of admiralty law). 
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Although the authority on treaties is richer, the same basic 
considerations apply for the judicial application of executive 
agreements and customary international law. Executive agreements 
also may live a dual life as formal sovereign obligations under 
international law,214 as well as judicially cognizable domestic law.215 
Likewise, norms of customary international law—once they coalesce 
through a near-universal state practice followed “from a sense of legal 
obligation”216—reflect binding rights or obligations under 
international law. As I have shown, in a large variety of 
circumstances, these international norms also may fall within the 
domestic enforcement authority of federal courts.217 
The essential message here is that when courts discharge their 
Article III duty to enforce treaties, customary international law, and 
executive agreements in domestic law, they simultaneously define the 
content of international law. Although independent of the political 
branches, the judiciary is a formal institution of the United States. 
Therefore, when their domestic mandate extends to international law, 
federal courts act as functional agents of the United States in external 
relations. This reality is attended by the very real possibility that a 
misguided domestic court could cause a breach of America’s 
international obligations. The international impact of American 
judicial action is amply illustrated by the German Constitutional 
Court’s nearly immediate reaction218 to the Supreme Court’s treaty 
decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.219 At stake in the judicial 
resolution of individual disputes under international law, in short, is 
 
 214. International law makes no formal distinction between types of “international 
agreements.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 2(1)(a), 1155 
U.N.T.S. at 333 (defining a “treaty” as “an international agreement concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law”). 
 215. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[T]he 
courts have the authority to construe . . . executive agreements . . . .” (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 211 (1962))); Kwan v. United States, 272 F.3d 1360, 1363 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although 
not a treaty, treaty principles have been applied to interpreting executive agreements.”); Bank 
Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Executive agreements . . . are 
interpreted in the same manner as treaties and reviewed by the same standard.”). 
 216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2). 
 217. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 2006, 
docket number 2 BvR 2115/01, ¶¶ 19–20, 53, (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/rk20060919_2bvr211501.html.  
 219. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).  
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the reputation of the United States as a faithful partner in 
international relations. 
The enforcement of international law through domestic legal 
proceedings thus is an immense responsibility. To return to the 
example of a treaty, enforcement involves judicial agency in the 
formal duty of “good faith” performance, which Professor Louis 
Henkin accurately describes as “the most important principle of 
international law.”220 In the formative years of the United States, the 
Supreme Court was acutely aware of the sensitivity of its position in 
such matters. The Court’s analysis in the 1821 case of The Amiable 
Isabella221 is worthy of special emphasis. “[I]n delivering [its] opinion 
to the world,” the Court in that case declared,  
[The issues at stake in treaty enforcement] embrace principles of 
international law of vast importance; they embrace private interests 
of no inconsiderable magnitude; and they embrace the 
interpretation of a treaty which we are bound to observe with the 
most scrupulous good faith, and which our Government could not 
violate without disgrace, and which this Court could not disregard 
without betraying its duty. It need not be said, therefore, that we 
feel the responsibility of our stations on this occasion.222 
These sentiments were once reflected in prudential doctrines 
designed to protect against judicial imprudence in foreign affairs. The 
twin principles of good faith and liberal treaty interpretation served 
to remind courts that substantially more is at stake in enforcing 
treaties than in applying laws of purely domestic origin.223 But as I 
have explained in detail in another article, these venerable doctrines 
quietly disappeared from judicial consciousness early in the twentieth 
century.224 And as the doctrine of stare decisis coalesced on a separate 
 
 220. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 62 
(1990). 
 221. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821). 
 222. Id.; see also Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884) (declaring that 
regarding the interpretation of treaty provisions, “the court cannot be unmindful of the fact that 
the honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in every inquiry 
whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be recognized and protected”); Bradley, supra 
note 205, at 133 (“[E]very treaty is a contract that implicates the U.S. relationship with one or 
more other nations, and such a relationship inherently includes political as well as legal 
elements, such as considerations of reciprocity, reputation, and national interest.”).  
 223. For a broad treatment of this subject, see generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death 
of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885 (2005). 
 224. See id. at 1907–19 (detailing the history of good faith in treaty jurisprudence). 
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path, judicial decisions insensitive to these concerns were reinforced 
with full precedential effect. 
Granted, the interpretation and application of legal norms are 
standard judicial fare. Additionally, prosaic domestic statutes or 
regulations may directly affect foreign affairs.225 But in such cases, the 
relationship between lawmaker and law applier is solely a domestic 
one.226 When Congress, for example, takes it upon itself to define the 
entire content of the law—without importing international legal 
norms—the courts need look only to familiar domestic sources and 
materials to guide their interpretive inquiries.227 To be sure, judicial 
action in these situations may have consequences for foreign 
relations. Nevertheless, in the context of purely domestic statutes, the 
courts’ essential role is to apply the value judgments first made by 
Congress within its constitutionally delegated sphere of authority.228 
Fidelity to those value judgments dispels both the appearance and 
effect of judicial leadership.229 
With respect to international law, by contrast, the necessary 
consequence of judicial precedent is the definition of rights or 
obligations that govern the nation’s relations with foreign states. 
Unavoidably, this task involves direct judicial entanglement in foreign 
affairs. The immensity of this responsibility should alone give judges 
pause before reflexively endowing such precedents with full stare 
decisis effect. But as the next Sections demonstrate, even the 
premises of stare decisis are compromised when the courts are called 
upon to determine the content of international law. 
 
 225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1(b) (1987) (including within “foreign relations law” purely domestic law that “has 
substantial significance for foreign relations . . . or has other substantial international 
consequences”); Moore, supra note 205, at 2250–53 (addressing the same point). 
 226. For administrative law, the sources of law are domestic regulatory agencies exercising 
authority delegated by Congress. 
 227. The Supreme Court missed this fundamental point in Sanchez-Llamas. In the process 
of rejecting a treaty claim in that case, the Court observed that “[i]t [wa]s no slight to the 
Convention to deny petitioners’ claims under the same principles [the Court] would apply to an 
Act of Congress.” Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006). 
 228. As I have noted, even in these situations, courts protect against international friction 
through interpretive presumptions. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
 229. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) 
(observing that although the statute in question had direct foreign-policy implications, “under 
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes” and, thus, the 
Court could not “shirk this responsibility merely because [its] decision may have significant 
political overtones”). 
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B. Destabilized Values: The Limits of Authority, Stability, and 
Legitimacy 
1. Stability and Exogenous Forces of Change: Unipolar Stare 
Decisis in a Multipolar System.  An essential foundation for a rational 
doctrine of binding precedent, as I have explained, is a court of last 
instance with the authority to settle the law within its defined 
jurisdiction.230 Stare decisis, then, advances the values of stability and 
predictability by compelling lower court fidelity in a hierarchically 
integrated system and bolsters judicial legitimacy by constraining the 
situational discretion of even the declaring court. 
Notions of stability and legitimacy take on different dynamics, 
however, when the subject matter for judicial precedents is 
international law. The origin of the legal norms in such inquiries—the 
source from which the norms emerge and derive their content—is the 
international legal system.231 Unfortunately or not, no judicial 
authority with the power to issue final and enforceable 
determinations on the content of international law exists. The ICJ 
could be in a position to fulfill this function. But the United States 
long ago withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ,232 and 
it appears prepared to do the same in response to any discrete 
jurisdictional grants when actual controversies arise.233 In any event, 
Medellín v. Texas234 made abundantly clear in 2008 that the 
international system itself does not compel precedential effect for ICJ 
judgments.235 
 
 230. See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra Part III.A. 
 232. See Press Statement, U.S. Dep’t of State, Concerning Termination of Acceptance of 
I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1743, 1744 (1985) (“[T]he 
President has concluded that continuation of our acceptance of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction would be contrary to our commitment to the principle of equal application of the 
law . . . .”). 
 233. The United States promptly withdrew from an optional jurisdictional protocol to the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations following an adverse decision by the ICJ. See Letter 
from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Kofi Annan, UN Sec’y-Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005), 
reprinted in 2308 U.N.T.S. 71, 71 (2005) (“[T]he United States will no longer recognize the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in [the protocol].”).  
 234. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 235. Id. at 1367 (“Nothing . . . suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable 
result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by 
‘many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.’” (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006))). 
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All that remains to settle the law are the disparate domestic 
courts of the states that compose the international system. But these 
courts are not integrated in any structural way, and certainly not 
hierarchically so. The process of interpretation and application in this 
realm is instead multipolar,236 with authority dispersed among the 
various judicial players in the system, as well as among a variety of 
other international, governmental, and nongovernmental institutions 
that seek to influence the content of the law. The problem is 
particularly acute for the unwritten rules of customary international 
law, founded as they are on evolving evidence of generalized state 
practice.237 With only a disaggregated judicial system, the 
development of precedent on such matters is a process, not an event. 
Systemic stare decisis makes no sense here. Systemic cohesion instead 
exists only through cooperation driven by good faith adherence to the 
rule of law among the participants.238 
The U.S. Supreme Court is, therefore, only one player in a 
multipolar field that admits of no binding precedent. The Court’s 
extensive review of treaty opinions by foreign courts in Abbott v. 
Abbott239 provided a positive illustration of this point.240 To be sure, 
the Court remains supreme in its own realm and thus may create 
domestic precedent in cases and controversies properly before it. In 
matters of international law, however, it lacks the legal authority, 
practical ability, and definitive expertise to secure compliance beyond 
its domestic mandate. Courts and similar institutions in other states 
are free, therefore, to reexamine, undermine, or even flatly reject a 
“final” decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. In short, such a final 
decision will not control in the very system that provides the content 
for the law and in which sanctions would be assessed. 
 
 236. I use this term in contradistinction to “polycentric” law. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE 
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 238–97 (1998) (describing a 
polycentric constitutional system). International law is not a lawless cloud of facts merely 
awaiting some indiscriminate form of seeding. It remains essentially state-centered and requires 
consent as reflected in the sovereign conduct of states. Though decentralized, the determination 
of international law thus proceeds on the foundation of accepted legal rules and through 
formalized judicial processes. 
 237. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 238. For a broader and more hopeful examination of the interaction among courts around 
the world, see Martinez, supra note 5, at 460–523. 
 239. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 240. See id. at 1993–94 (2010) (surveying divergent sovereign interpretations of ne exeat 
rights under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction).  
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The result is that judicial precedent in matters of foreign affairs 
cannot bring the systemic “calm” that stare decisis is designed to 
secure. In this multipolar system, a judgment by any one court cannot 
control future developments in the system. Contrary to the 
jurisdictional premises of stare decisis, in other words, an 
international-law decision by a domestic court is subject to immediate 
and potentially destructive forces of change exogenous to the 
domestic polity. 
Moreover, the vast majority of states that compose the 
international system do not follow stare decisis.241 Prudential 
considerations continue to hold some sway, as comparative studies of 
judicial practice have demonstrated.242 But the prevailing foreign 
practice of elevating the law over a mere initial judicial impression of 
it demonstrates that immediate adherence to precedent is neither 
axiomatic nor “indispensable” to the rule of law.243 Moreover, the 
willingness of foreign courts to reassess initial impressions based on a 
higher quality of information highlights the inability of any domestic 
judicial precedent to introduce stability into the content of 
international law. 
In any event, careful reflection reveals that existing stare decisis 
doctrine already contains the flexibility to recognize—although the 
courts themselves have not yet explicitly recognized—that evolving 
evidence of international law may immediately undermine a 
precedent. I have shown in the area of treaty law, for example, that 
the identification of the definitive “shared expectations” of the treaty 
partners requires an examination of those partners’ “subsequent 
course[s] of conduct,” as well as an analysis of the views of their own 
domestic courts.244 Even a Supreme Court treaty decision will not 
 
 241. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 22 (2d ed. 1987) (“[S]tare 
decisis . . . is . . . rejected by the civil law tradition.”). The ICJ likewise does not follow a formal 
doctrine of precedent. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1062, 3 Bevans 1179, 1190 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”).  
 242. See MERRYMAN, supra note 241, at 47 (“Although there is no formal rule of stare 
decisis, the practice is for judges to be influenced by prior decisions.”). For a comprehensive 
treatment of the subject, see generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
(D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997). 
 243. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[I]t is common 
wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command.’” (quoting Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
 244. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text. 
VAN ALSTINE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2012  8:15 PM 
990 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:941 
control future developments of either of these important interpretive 
sources. 
This discussion demonstrates that the foundations of judicial 
decisions involving international legal norms are particularly 
susceptible to immediate destabilization. To be sure, even a purely 
domestic-law precedent may be affected by subsequent legal and 
societal developments. But stare decisis works as a serious constraint 
on such endogenous forces and, except at the margins and over a 
significant period of time, almost completely prevents them within the 
judicial system. In international-law matters, however, exogenous 
forces of change may have an immediate and direct influence on 
precedent. And, significantly, the absence of an integrated judicial 
system means that a principal catalyst for such change actually may be 
later courts called upon to address the same subject. 
Unfortunately, as noted in the Introduction of this Article,245 the 
Supreme Court has missed two prime opportunities to recognize this 
point. In Sanchez-Llamas in 2006, the Court examined the force of 
subsequent ICJ rulings on an original treaty-interpretation decision.246 
Regrettably, however, the majority’s opinion focused only on the 
direct precedential effect of the ICJ rulings.247 Only Justice Breyer, 
writing in dissent, recognized—properly, although only briefly—that 
the ICJ decisions in fact reflected the kind of subsequent 
developments that are relevant for stare decisis analysis.248 Four years 
later, the Court returned to the same subject in Medellín after a 
definitive decision by the ICJ that expressly rejected the Court’s 
earlier decision in Sanchez-Llamas.249 But the Supreme Court again 
 
 245. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 246. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–57 (2006). 
 247. See id. at 355 (observing that ICJ decisions are entitled only to “respectful 
consideration” (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 248. See id. at 389–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that although the Court’s earlier 
decisions are “entitled to full stare decisis effect,” the later decisions of the ICJ “amount to a 
‘significant . . . subsequent development’ of the law sufficient to lead to a reconsideration of past 
precedent” (omission in original) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997))); 
Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 689 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In the past the Court 
has revisited its interpretation of a treaty when new international law has come to light.”). 
 249. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1348 (2008) (holding that Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), was not “enforceable federal law”); 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 34, 63 (“[T]he court is unable to uphold 
the contention of the United States that . . . it [is] without jurisdiction to order [specific 
remedies] . . . .”); supra notes 17–21. 
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analyzed only the binding effect of the ICJ’s holding;250 no Justice saw 
the ruling as an additional, subsequent fact that permitted the 
Supreme Court itself to reexamine its original analysis. 
The point is not that the conclusions in Sanchez-Llamas and 
Medellín necessarily were wrongheaded. It is that the Court missed 
serious opportunities to refine the proper understanding of stare 
decisis in relation to the international legal obligations of the United 
States. This failure is especially regrettable for the practice of stare 
decisis in the federal courts of appeals. I have much more to say about 
that dynamic in the remainder of this Section and in the Sections to 
follow.251 The point of emphasis at this stage is that nearly all final 
declarations of international law in the United States come from the 
federal courts of appeals, not from the Supreme Court.252 
Unfortunately, however, the rigid rules of vertical stare decisis that 
govern in those courts effectively prohibit consideration of the 
exogenous forces that distinctively affect the continuing validity of 
judicial precedents on such matters. 
2. Expertise and the Risks of Error.  The task of a federal court in 
interpreting even a purely domestic statute is not an easy one. 
Language often is ambiguous, and the lawmaker’s intent often is 
unclear. Congress also may default to empty linguistic compromises 
to avoid difficult political choices. Some implications of legislation 
may not be foreseeable in any event. As a result, even though the 
lawmaker and the law applier may share a common legal, political, 
and linguistic culture, the proper judicial role in applying statutory 
law has spawned spirited scholarly debates.253 
The judicial responsibility to declare the law is substantially more 
difficult when the subject is international law. By their nature, 
international legal norms result from processes and substantive 
compromises that cross legal, political, and cultural divides. 
 
 250. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1359 (“ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in 
domestic courts.”). 
 251. See infra Part IV.B. 
 252. See infra notes 380–85 and accompanying text. 
 253. For an introduction to the voluminous literature on this subject, see generally William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory 
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren 
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); John F. Manning, Deriving 
Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (2001); and 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).  
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Specialized practices, usages, and conventions also provide a 
framework for specialized understandings. Even shared legal 
concepts often require translation—linguistic, cultural, or otherwise.254 
For any particular domestic court, therefore, the legal product of an 
international lawmaking process is, quite literally, foreign. 
This characterization is accurate even for conventional law in the 
form of treaties and executive agreements. As I have analyzed in 
another article, the negotiation and drafting process for treaties—in 
particular the inability of the majority to impose its will on 
objectors—contrasts starkly from that for domestic statutes.255 With 
the overlay of heterogeneity among the negotiators, the result is often 
broad linguistic compromises of complicated, multilateral origins.256 
Participant diversity likewise often requires adoption of texts in 
multiple languages, all of which are equally authoritative.257 Treaties 
may also contain “false friends,” both linguistic and conceptual, and 
may otherwise settle only uncomfortably in America’s distinctive 
legal culture. Even plain meanings thus may not be so plain. 
Customary international law is fraught with the bulk of these 
challenges and more. Customary international law arises through a 
cooperative, multipolar process whose results are not distilled in any 
authoritative text, much less in a coherent, comprehensive 
compilation.258 Domestic courts called upon to enforce such rules, 
therefore, must examine the results of a fluid process with multiple 
players from widely divergent cultural, legal, political, and linguistic 
 
 254. See, e.g., Alex Glashauser, What We Must Never Forget when It Is a Treaty We Are 
Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1294 (2005) (examining the special challenges in 
interpreting international treaties); Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation 
of Multilingual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 615 (1997) (focusing on the 
challenges that arise in the common case of treaties with multiple authoritative-language texts). 
 255. See Van Alstine, supra note 223, at 1923–24 (“The very process of negotiating and 
drafting treaties . . . means that the legal product may be fundamentally different than other 
forms of law . . . .”). 
 256. See Bradley, supra note 205, at 157 (discussing the linguistic idiosyncrasies of 
multilateral treaties); Van Alstine, supra note 223, at 1923–24 (highlighting the difficulties 
inherent in composing complex agreements among multiple sovereigns).  
 257. See generally Shelton, supra note 254, at 613–18 (providing background information on 
the use of multiple languages in various treaties). 
 258. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 400 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ustomary international 
law—as the term itself implies—is created by the general customs and practice of nations and 
therefore does not stem from any single, definitive, readily-identifiable source.” (quoting Flomo 
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011))).  
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traditions.259 This diversity may obscure the significance of any 
particular state action, expression, or practice. Strikingly uneven 
levels of development and international participation further 
complicate the picture. Simply gathering reliable information thus 
represents an enormous undertaking for the courts,260 especially if 
they are to take seriously the requirement of a real “general and 
consistent” practice of states throughout the international system.261 
American courts, too, approach the problem schooled in a distinctive 
legal system and with their own distinctive cultural assumptions. 
The special challenges courts face when they inquire into foreign 
affairs already have found expression in Supreme Court opinions. In 
particular, I demonstrated in Part II.B how concerns about judicial 
expertise, access to reliable information, and the uncertain 
implications of judicial precedents have informed analyses of foreign 
affairs abstention doctrines.262 Ultimately, these considerations reflect 
ex ante admonitions to the courts about the risks of improvident 
action based on insufficient or unreliable information. The message, 
in short, is that the risks of error in first judicial impressions of 
international law are simply greater than with prosaic domestic law. 
These combined considerations retain their force even after a 
court has created a precedent in the field. That is, the insights about 
the need for ex ante judicial modesty in foreign affairs generally do 
not lose their relevance simply because a court has taken a stab at 
resolving a particular legal issue. Thus, a generic notion of stare 
decisis, for all its important functions in any rule-bound system, runs 
contrary to the array of prudential cautions against ill-advised judicial 
 
 259. See id. (“The determination of what offenses violate customary international law . . . is 
no simple task. Customary international law is discerned from myriad decisions made in 
numerous and varied international and domestic arenas.” (omission in original) (quoting Flomo, 
643 F.3d at 1015)); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016 (“[A] custom cannot be identified with the same 
confidence as a provision in a legally authoritative text, such as a statute or a treaty.”).  
 260. See Aziz, 658 F.3d at 400 (“[T]he relevant evidence of customary international law is 
widely dispersed and generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.” (quoting Flomo, 643 F.3d at 
1015)); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 194 (2d Cir. 2009) (using the same description of 
the “relevant evidence of customary international law” (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 
414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003))).  
 261. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 262. See RAMSEY, supra note 135, at 326–27 (“[I]t is surely true that, especially in 
international matters, courts sometimes lack access to factual information needed to resolve 
cases.”); Charney, supra note 5, at 102–04 (examining, as factors in political question analysis in 
foreign affairs, such considerations as “expertise in the law,” “access to facts,” that 
“international law is alien,” “important and uncertain effects,” and the need for a “sole voice”); 
supra Part II.B. 
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leadership in international law—unless one is comfortable with the 
conceit that judges nearly always get the answer right the first time. 
There is every reason to believe, however, that judicial 
misjudgments are more common in the identification of international 
law.263 This observation is no slight. The unfamiliar and unstable 
terrain simply makes the judicial task more challenging in this field. 
In short, an increased likelihood exists that a particular precedent will 
not be “well reasoned”264 in the first place. This likelihood does not 
mean that courts should abdicate their duty to resolve disputes 
properly before them. It is, however, further evidence that rigid stare 
decisis norms are inappropriate when, in the context of resolving 
these disputes, courts create precedents in the sensitive realm of 
international law. 
C. Separation of Powers, Stare Decisis, and Judicially Enforceable 
International Law 
A deeper appreciation of the relationship between precedent 
and separation of powers also counsels in favor of a reassessment of 
stare decisis as to questions of international law. In foreign affairs 
matters, in particular those that touch on international law, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the judiciary should be 
“particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative 
and Executive Branches.”265 To reiterate one of my major themes, this 
concern—grounded in the separation-of-powers relationships 
between the judiciary and the political branches—does not dissolve 
merely because a court has created a precedent. 
1. Legitimacy of the Judicial Branch and the Blurring of Law-
Finding with Lawmaking.  In the American constitutional system, the 
federal judicial branch, “purposefully insulated from democratic 
pressures,” fundamentally is not a lawmaker.266 This general principle 
deserves special emphasis in the field of foreign affairs. The Court’s 
occasional statements that the actions of the political branches in 
foreign affairs are “largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
 
 263. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 265. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1964) (highlighting the need “to reflect the proper distribution 
of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing 
upon foreign affairs”). 
 266. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988). 
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interference,”267 though jolting when taken out of context, merely 
reflect a basic insight: that the province of the judicial branch does 
not extend to supervising questions of foreign relations that are 
unhinged from Article III cases or controversies.268 As I have shown, 
however, the cases or controversies that nonetheless compel judicial 
engagement with international legal relations are broad and 
numerous indeed.269 
The judiciary’s position in such engagements differs from its 
position with respect to purely domestic law as a matter of kind, not 
merely of degree. This point has been woven through much of my 
analysis in this Article. Here, I explore the institutional implications. 
Recall, first, that a judicial decision on international law by its nature 
involves a formal definition of the rights or obligations that govern 
the nation’s legal relations with foreign states. At its most 
consequential, this task involves the identification of the sovereign 
legal obligations of the United States, whether owed to other states or 
owed to private entities.270 International law also may address 
relations solely between private parties;271 but even in that event, 
judicial action is premised on the right or obligation of the United 
States to enforce norms that arise out of legal relations with other 
sovereign states.272 
This functional sense of agency alone is uncharacteristic of the 
judicial station within the American constitutional system. It becomes 
especially problematic, however, in light of the nature and the extent 
 
 267. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 589 (1952)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 268. See, e.g., Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 488 (1901) (noting that the Supreme Court 
“has no power” to enforce international-treaty obligations denounced by the United States); 
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (observing that when a treaty does not of its 
own force create judicially enforceable domestic law, “its infraction becomes the subject of 
international negotiations and reclamations, . . . . [with which] the judicial courts have nothing to 
do and [for which they] can give no redress”); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 
48 (1851) (declaring that whether the United States had complied with its executory promises 
under a treaty “is a question . . . with which the judicial branch has no concern”). 
 269. See supra Part II.C. 
 270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 101 (1987). 
 271. For a prominent example, see the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (1988). 
 272. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES pt. VII intro. note (“[C]ustomary international law and numerous international 
agreements have created obligations for states in relation to persons, both natural and 
juridical.”). 
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of the value judgments that inhere in the identification and 
enforcement of international law. As a general matter, uncertainty in 
the articulation of legal rules often requires value judgments as courts 
fulfill their duty to “expound and interpret” the law.273 As Judge 
Jerome Frank observes, the risk in such cases is that “interpretation is 
inescapably a kind of legislation.”274 
The problem is particularly acute in the fluid world of 
international law. The Supreme Court stated this point directly in 
Sosa: “[A] judge deciding in reliance on an international norm will 
find a substantial element of discretionary judgment in the 
decision.”275 By whatever term one prefers, discretion in the 
identification of binding legal norms inevitably involves lawmaking. 
Concerns about freelance lawmaking are greatest with respect to 
the identification of customary international law. By their nature, the 
voluminous domestic incorporations of international law276 create a 
moving target for the judiciary. That is, open-ended references to 
“international law” or “the law of nations” require the judiciary to 
identify the content of international norms as those norms find 
acceptance and evolve through state practice and dialogue over time. 
For common-lawmaking of this type, moreover, modern realism has 
long since dispatched the fiction that courts merely “find” the law. 
Instead, as the Supreme Court aptly observed in Sosa, in most such 
matters, “there is a general understanding that the law is not so much 
found or discovered as it is either made or created.”277 The absence of 
an authoritative text; the complicated and unfamiliar lawmaking 
processes; and the linguistic, cultural, and legal differences among the 
participants278 combine to increase substantially the “open texture”279 
of this form of judicially enforceable law. In many cases, the 
 
 273. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 274. Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (1947). 
 275. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004). 
 276. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.  
 277. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725; see also id. at 729 (“[W]e now tend to understand common law 
not as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product of 
human choice.”). 
 278. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 279. The famous scholar of jurisprudence Professor H.L.A. Hart employed this term to 
describe the indeterminacy in the law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–25 (1961) 
(“Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen . . . will, at some point where their 
application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open 
texture.”).  
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ambiguous mixture of law and policy that pervades international 
relations fosters doubt over the very existence of legal rules. The 
disordered, fluid process for addressing these consequent doubts 
through judicial interpretation only deepens and prolongs the 
indeterminacy.280 Even the evidentiary standards are unclear, for 
international law sanctions resorting to “any relevant material or 
source” in identifying the content of the law.281 
The difficulty of this enterprise is richly illustrated by two federal 
court opinions that thoroughly analyzed the international law of 
piracy but came to diametrically opposed conclusions.282 At issue in 
both cases was an 1819 statute that mandates life in prison for “the 
crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations.”283 When first 
analyzing the statute in 1820, the Supreme Court looked to a wide 
range of interpretive sources on the law of nations: scholarly treatises, 
“the general usage and practice of nations,” and judicial decisions.284 
When reassessing the issue in 2010 in United States v. Said,285 a district 
court judge relied heavily on principles of stare decisis and specifically 
limited construction of the statute to the Supreme Court’s 1820 
interpretation.286 The judge concluded, moreover, that this nearly 200-
year-old Supreme Court precedent “[wa]s the only clear, undisputed 
precedent that interprets the statute at issue” and that modern 
international-law sources on the definition of piracy “[we]re 
unsettled.”287 In United States v. Hasan,288 however, a federal judge 
from the same district concluded, after extensive analysis, that the 
statutory incorporation of “the law of nations” embraced an evolving 
standard of piracy informed by modern norms of customary 
 
 280. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 434–35 (1964) (describing as 
“quite unpersuasive” the argument that the Court should recognize a rule of international law 
on the act-of-state doctrine merely because “United States courts could make a significant 
contribution to the growth of international law”). 
 281. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 113 (1987) (stating that, in such inquiries, “[c]ourts may in their discretion consider 
any relevant material or source, including expert testimony”). 
 282. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. Hasan, 747 
F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 283. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1651 (2006)). 
 284. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820). 
 285. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 286. Id. at 559–60. 
 287. Id. at 564–66. 
 288. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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international law.289 The judge in Hasan went on to hold that, far from 
being unsettled as the judge in Said had claimed, modern customary 
international law defining piracy was clear.290 
Judicial action in this field also is subject to special sensitivities 
not present in purely domestic law, whether embodied in statutes, 
regulations, or federal common law. Concerns about the democracy 
deficit that surround judicial discretion in general are especially 
pronounced in the international realm.291 Moreover, episodic and 
interstitial judicial lawmaking involving international law does not 
occur within a cohesive domestic legal system like the one familiar to 
the courts. This circumstance further exposes the judiciary’s inability 
to provide the “flexibility, completeness, and comprehensive 
coherence”292 that are especially important in delicate matters of 
foreign relations. 
To be sure, the Constitution expressly contemplates judicial 
enforcement of treaties.293 On this basis, federal courts properly have 
applied treaties throughout constitutional history.294 Furthermore, a 
treaty’s text provides a substantially more secure foundation for 
faithful interpretation. Nonetheless, the identification of treaty 
obligations also raises concerns about the nature and extent of 
independent judicial value judgments. The special legal, cultural, and 
linguistic challenges that complicate the interpretation of treaties also 
increase the open texture of the law and thus the space for judicial 
discretion. In addition, the evolving, cooperative process of treaty 
interpretation in the international realm means that courts shape the 
 
 289. See id. at 623 (“[T]he Court concludes that both the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and 
Supreme Court precedent indicate that the ‘law of nations’ connotes a changing body of law, 
and that the definition of piracy in 18 U.S.C. § 1651 must therefore be assessed according to the 
international consensus definition at the time of the alleged offense.”); id. at 623–30 (analyzing 
the issue in more detail). 
 290. See id. at 632 (“Defendants point to the writings of several scholars in arguing that 
there is no consensus definition of piracy under modern international law. The Court finds that 
the evidence supports a conclusion to the contrary.”).  
 291. See, e.g., McGinnis & Somin, supra note 164, at 1193–1224 (examining the democracy 
deficit in the creation and identification of customary international law). 
 292. See HENKIN, supra note 116, at 140 (“Judge-made law, the courts must recognize, can 
serve foreign policy only interstitially, grossly, and spasmodically . . . .”).  
 293. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the[] Authority [of 
the United States].”). 
 294. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011) 
(comprehensively examining the history of Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence). 
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content of the law whenever they purport to interpret it.295 This 
practical constraint on the discretion of future decisionmakers 
highlights a phenomenon that Professor Frederick Schauer terms “the 
forward-looking aspect of precedent.”296 As a result of this epistemic 
force of precedent, judge-found law for treaties functions as a close 
cousin of judge-made law. 
The consequences of precedent involving international law, as I 
have argued, can also be substantially more significant than the 
consequences of precedent involving purely domestic law. The 
Supreme Court itself has highlighted the “risks of adverse foreign 
policy consequences” that attend judicial forays into international 
law.297 Granted, not all such matters will touch “national nerves” to 
the same extent.298 Nonetheless, even judicial interpretations of purely 
private-law treaties can trigger significant international friction. The 
recurrent controversies over the proper scope of custodial rights 
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction299 provide a good example. Although litigants under 
the treaty are private parties, perceived judicial infidelity to this 
treaty’s obligations has led to recriminations at the highest levels of 
government.300 Indeed, controversies have flared even between the 
United States and its close ally Germany over whether German 
courts have faithfully fulfilled their obligation under the treaty to 
return children abducted from the United States.301 And as the 
Supreme Court long ago observed, “[E]xperience has shown that 
 
 295. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 103(2)(b) (1987) (declaring that, in determining the content of international law, the 
“judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals” are accorded “substantial weight”). 
 296. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987). 
 297. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004). 
 298. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“It is also evident 
that some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do 
others . . . .”). 
 299. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 
172.  
 300. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (highlighting “the diplomatic 
consequences resulting from this Court’s interpretation of ‘rights of custody’” under the 
Convention, “including the likely reaction of other contracting states and the impact on the 
State Department’s ability to reclaim children abducted from [the United States]” (quoting 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 172, art. 
5(a), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99)).  
 301. For a review of this controversy in the early 2000s, see generally Dagmar Coester-
Waltjen, The Future of the Hague Child Abduction Convention: The Rise of Domestic and 
International Tensions—The European Perspective, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 59 (2000). 
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international controversies of the gravest moment . . . may arise from 
real or imagined wrongs to [another nation’s] subjects inflicted, or 
permitted, by a government.”302 
The message here is not that judicial precedent on matters of 
international law is, in a formal sense, “illegitimate,” as Justice Scalia 
asserted in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.303 Courts may and should decide 
such matters. Increased indeterminacy in the production of 
international law, however, entails increased discretion in its 
application. This dynamic, in turn, creates the appearance and often 
the effect of judicial leadership in the very definition of legal relations 
with foreign states. An overwhelming international consensus on a 
particular issue—say, on torture or genocide304—may diminish the 
impression of judicial innovation.305 But as courts participate in the 
identification of the law itself, they approach the outer edges of their 
legitimate judicial function. In doing so, they run a greater risk of 
undermining the perception of a principled, law-bound judiciary.306 
Finally, in this field with unclear guideposts, the implications of a 
given precedent may be particularly difficult to gauge. Here again, 
jurisprudence has addressed the risks of judicial leadership with an ex 
ante admonition about untutored ventures into sensitive matters of 
foreign relations.307 And here again, the insights of this admonition do 
not disappear simply because a court has in fact assumed such 
leadership in the form of precedent. 
 
 302. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941). 
 303. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750–51 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 304. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[C]ustomary 
international law imposes individual liability for . . . war crimes, crimes against humanity (such 
as genocide), and torture . . . .”), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011); Kadic v. Karadžic, 70 F.3d 
232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations 
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private 
individuals.”). 
 305. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“It should be 
apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of 
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding 
it . . . .”). 
 306. See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 307. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (stating that because of the “risks of adverse foreign policy 
consequences,” attempts by courts to create remedies for violations of international law “should 
be undertaken, if at all, with great caution”); id. at 726 (observing that on such matters, “the 
general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority 
over substantive law”). 
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2. The Uneasy Role of Congress and the Availability of Legislative 
Override.  The most obvious and potentially significant response to 
my analysis thus far is that Congress is available to correct judicial 
misadventures on matters of international law just as it can correct 
misadventures on matters of domestic law. As discussed, the 
possibility of congressional override has led to a “super-strong” 
version of stare decisis for statutory-interpretation precedents, as 
contrasted with constitutional ones.308 One might reason from this 
premise that similar logic should apply to judicial decisions founded 
on international law. Careful analysis reveals, however, that proper 
respect for Congress’s constitutional role as the substantive lawmaker 
in fact counsels in favor of judicial modesty when courts have created 
precedents on such matters. 
Little doubt exists that Congress has the authority, as a matter of 
domestic law, to modify or nullify judicial action interpreting 
customary international law.309 Established doctrine also permits 
Congress to abrogate a treaty.310 In the Military Commissions Act of 
2006,311 however, Congress purported to go further by reversing the 
Supreme Court’s pure interpretation of the Geneva Convention 
Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War312 in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.313 One could well construct a compelling argument that 
 
 308. See supra notes 66–79 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (declaring that Congress “may modify or cancel any judicial 
decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as such”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987) (stating 
that “[a]n act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law . . . as law of the United 
States”). 
 310. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1359 n.5 (2008) (“[A] later-in-time federal 
statute supersedes inconsistent treaty provisions.”); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 
175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899) (“It has been adjudged that Congress by legislation . . . could abrogate 
a treaty . . . .”); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (“[A treaty] is subject to such 
acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.”). Congress may not, 
however, strip vested treaty rights. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899) (observing that 
“Congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights under a treaty, or to affect titles 
already granted by the treaty itself”); Wilson v. Wall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 83, 89 (1867) (“Congress 
has no constitutional power to settle the rights under treaties except in cases purely political.”). 
 311. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 312. Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950). 
 313. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see also Military Commissions Act of 2006 
§ 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 1632 (defining “grave breaches” of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 
and declaring that this definition “fully satisf[ies]” the obligations of the United States under the 
convention). 
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Congress did not have the authority to do so, despite the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.314 That is, whether Congress may arrogate to itself 
the purely judicial task of treaty interpretation if it otherwise leaves a 
treaty fully in effect is at least open to question.315 
In any event, the animating force for the different treatment of 
constitutional and statutory precedents is not found in the simple 
possibility of congressional override. The special force of stare decisis 
on statutory matters instead arises from respect for the policymaking 
authority of Congress within the realm of its own legislative 
products.316 When Congress itself establishes the content of the law, 
the proper role of the judiciary is to implement the value choices 
made by the people’s representatives during that process. And once a 
court has faithfully done so, deferring to Congress for subsequent 
correction of a law of the legislature’s own creation is entirely 
appropriate. 
On this score, precedents founded on international law differ 
fundamentally from those arising from the interpretation of purely 
domestic statutes. Congress is the lawmaking source for neither 
customary international law nor treaties. Indeed, the rules of 
customary international law arise without formal sanction by any 
domestic legislative institutions.317 As a result, enforcement of these 
 
 314. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 
DUKE L.J. 267, 271–72 (1993) (discussing the “propriety” requirements of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause). 
 315. The distinction here is between abrogating a treaty and compelling the courts to 
interpret it in a particular way. The former is clearly a legislative power; the latter shades much 
closer to a judicial power reserved to Article III courts. As the Supreme Court observed in Plaut 
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), Congress may not “indirectly control the action of 
the courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views,” id. at 225 
(quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 94–
95 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868)). The quoted scholar also observes in the same work that 
a legislature may not “compel the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a 
law which the legislature permits to remain in force.” COOLEY, supra, at 94. Several Supreme 
Court Justices, however, in other circumstances has indicated otherwise. See United States v. 
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 375 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]f Congress does not like the 
interpretation that a treaty has been given by the courts or by the President, it may abrogate or 
amend it as a matter of internal law by simply enacting inconsistent legislation.”); Chew Heong 
v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 562–63 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (observing that “Congress 
may, as with an ordinary statute, modify [a treaty’s] provisions, or supersede them altogether”).  
 316. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 317. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (observing that the courts “have 
no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of 
nations”); supra note 258.  
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rules in the courts—whether founded on delegated or autonomous 
authority318—requires independent judicial assessment of the content 
and even the existence of the law.319 Whatever limited evidence may 
be available concerning the formal value judgments that were at play 
during the creation of the law, the relevant source is not Congress, 
but rather the complicated, fluid, and multipolar lawmaking processes 
examined in Part III.B, which are almost entirely external to the 
American polity.320 
Though Article II treaties are different in nuance, the same 
principle applies. In that context, the value judgments distilled into 
law arise through external negotiations with foreign treaty partners 
within the specialized framework of international law.321 Moreover, 
under Article II, the Senate—not Congress as a whole—is the formal 
source of legislative approval of treaties.322 And neither the Senate 
alone nor even the Senate in cooperation with the president323 has the 
power to override a judicial treaty precedent.324 
This situation substantially complicates the dialogue between 
lawmakers and law interpreters that Professor William Eskridge 
highlights in the context of domestic statutory interpretation.325 For 
matters of international law, the lawmaking process commonly is 
unstructured, multipolar, and considerably more opaque. It likewise 
involves a continuing and fluid relationship with foreign sovereigns, 
managed by the executive branch. The interpretive process itself is a 
multipolar enterprise that includes cooperation among systemically 
 
 318. See supra notes 175–88 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 273–95 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra notes 277–91 and accompanying text. 
 321. The same is true for “treaty-statutes,” by which Congress incorporates the substance of 
a treaty into domestic law through an Article I lawmaking process. See supra notes 171–74 and 
accompanying text. 
 322. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the president the “Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur”). 
 323. Professor John Yoo advances the extreme—and, in my view, misguided—opinion that 
the president has a “unilateral” power to interpret and reinterpret treaties. John Yoo, Politics as 
Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 851, 868 (2001). But see Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty 
Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1275–80 (2002) (responding to Professor Yoo’s argument). 
 324. See Pepke v. United States (In re Fourteen Diamond Rings), 183 U.S. 176, 180 (1901) 
(“The meaning of the treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some of those 
who may have voted to ratify it.”). 
 325. See Eskridge, supra note 66, at 353–90 (modeling the interactions among the Court, 
Congress, and the president in statutory interpretation). 
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unconnected domestic courts and nonjudicial international 
institutions.326 The instrumental argument that correction of judicial 
precedents should be left to Congress as the original source of law 
thus loses its essential justification in this context. 
A skeptic would likely respond to this functional point with the 
formal argument that Congress nonetheless has the technical 
authority to correct judicial precedents on international law as a 
matter of domestic law.327 Although valid for purely domestic statutes, 
this formalistic point is unconvincing in the context of international 
law for three interrelated reasons. The first is a reminder that the 
subject of precedent on such matters is distinctly significant and 
sensitive: interpretation in these cases involves a declaration of the 
rights or obligations that govern the nation’s legal relations with 
foreign states.328 When one further considers the courts’ comparative 
lack of competence,329 judicial leadership that has been fortified by 
stare decisis is problematic in any event. 
Second, and more important, the formal argument relies on a 
problematic inversion of the standard lawmaking sequence prescribed 
by the Constitution—Congress creates; the courts apply. When the 
courts instead first find and declare the law, the burden falls on 
Congress to overcome the Constitution’s procedural hurdles for the 
creation of federal statutory law.330 The “complex set of procedures 
that Congress and the president must follow to enact ‘Laws of the 
United States’”331 are substantial, time-consuming, and politically 
costly. And this process must occur amid the crowded agenda that 
generally strains the attention of the nation’s legislators. 
For purposes of importing norms from customary international 
law, admittedly, the Constitution expressly authorizes action by 
Congress as a whole.332 This reality, however, only serves to reinforce 
the point. By its nature, a precedent on such a matter involves judicial 
 
 326. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text.  
 327. Professor Eskridge has suggested that political considerations sometimes make 
Congress attentive to judicial decisions, but that many actual “overrides” involve the 
modernization of a law by a later Congress, not the correction of judicial error. See Eskridge, 
supra note 66, at 335–53 (reviewing congressional overrides from 1967 through 1990). 
 328. See supra Part III.A. 
 329. See supra notes 147–54 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998) (“[T]he power to enact 
statutes may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure.’” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))). 
 331. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1206–07 (2009) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945–46). 
 332. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.  
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leadership to identify the very existence of the law.333 A robust version 
of stare decisis would then impose on Congress the burden of 
overcoming the Constitution’s substantial procedural hurdles simply 
to reassert its rightful place as the preeminent lawmaker. 
The lawmaking sequence for Article II treaties, to be sure, 
includes the original involvement of both the president and the 
Senate. Even in this context, however, to say that Congress formally 
is available to correct misguided judicial precedents does not mean 
that such a constitutional arrangement is preferable. The 
interpretation of a treaty, in its essence, is a judicial act.334 Congress 
may, by statute, fully abrogate a treaty, but for Congress to leave a 
treaty in place and use legislative processes to perform the judicial act 
of reinterpreting the treaty to fit legislative preferences is entirely 
different. 
Moreover, the considerable obstacles to the creation of federal 
law are amplified in matters of international law. For purposes of 
domestic law, a judicial precedent in the field represents a formal 
declaration of the state of international law. Any congressional 
attempt to convey displeasure with such a precedent will run into the 
dense web of clear-statement rules that protect international law from 
implicit legislative override.335 Even the limited openings the Supreme 
Court has allowed for acknowledging informal expressions of 
congressional preferences in statutory interpretation,336 therefore, 
presumably would not be available in the case of a precedent 
interpreting international law. To the contrary, congressional inaction 
may be construed as supportive, as the Court indicated in Sosa.337 
 
 333. See supra notes 273–96 and accompanying text. 
 334. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (stating that “courts interpret 
treaties for themselves”); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899) (“The construction of treaties 
is the peculiar province of the judiciary . . . .”). 
 335. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
 336. Existing jurisprudence points in opposite directions regarding the influence of informal 
expressions of intent by a subsequent Congress. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (“The ‘classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over 
time . . . necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the implications 
of a later statute.’” (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988))). But see 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117–18 (1980) (“[T]he 
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier 
one.” (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 337. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (2004) (stating that federal courts 
need not “shut the door to the law of nations entirely” because Congress has “expressed no 
disagreement” with the courts’ past practice of consulting “international norm[s]”). 
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Third, no effective mechanism exists with which to return 
questions to the lawmaking source to correct judicial decisions on 
international law. The creation or revision of customary international 
law, treaties, and executive agreements requires the cooperation of 
sovereign entities beyond the reach of the American polity. This 
cooperation, moreover, is purely discretionary. As a result, 
readjustment of a bilateral treaty or executive agreement at the sole 
instigation of the United States can be delicate, and it is practically 
impossible in the case of multilateral treaties and customary 
international law.338 
In short, the institutional relationship between Congress and the 
courts counsels for judicial modesty regarding the force of precedents 
on international law. In practical effect, unthinking adherence to stare 
decisis locks in problematic judicial leadership against both judicial 
reexamination and—even if available in principle—subsequent 
congressional override. And as I have shown, in the unfamiliar terrain 
of international law, both the consequences and the likelihood of 
judicial error are substantially greater in the first place. 
3. Accommodating the Executive Branch’s Special 
Responsibilities in Foreign Affairs.  A coherent doctrine of stare 
decisis should also accommodate, but should not be overawed by, the 
special responsibilities of the executive branch in foreign affairs. I 
noted in Part II.B that the executive branch’s comparative 
institutional advantages commend a general judicial modesty in 
foreign affairs matters.339 These expressions of respect for the 
executive branch’s superior expertise have distilled into formal 
doctrines with a direct impact on the province of the courts. Modern 
doctrine holds that, although not conclusive, the executive branch’s 
views on the interpretation of treaties are entitled to “great weight.”340 
 
 338. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 197, art. 40(4), 1155 
U.N.T.S. at 342 (providing that state parties to multilateral treaties cannot be bound to 
amendments without their consent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) (observing that the creation of a norm of 
customary international law requires a “general and consistent practice of states”); supra notes 
258–61 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
 340. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. 
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); Medellín v. Texas, 
128 S. Ct. 1346, 1349 (2008) (quoting Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 185) (internal quotation mark 
omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 326(2) (stating that courts “will give great weight” to executive treaty interpretations).  
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Although the quality of precedent on the question is less impressive, 
similar sentiments should apply in situations involving customary 
international law341 and, presumably, sole executive agreements as 
well.342 
Ultimately, these doctrines result in substantial deference to 
executive-branch views on the content of international law. Scholars 
have even variously described the proposition as “super-strong 
deference”343 or as being reflective of a constitutional scheme of 
“shared” interpretive authority.344 The historical record of actual 
outcomes is uneven, although the weight of evidence points to 
considerable deference to executive views, in particular on the 
interpretation of treaties.345 
In spite of these protections, judicial precedent involving 
international law has the potential to create tensions not present in 
purely domestic law. If the subject matter is properly within the 
judiciary’s Article III authority, a final precedent determining the 
force of international law is binding on the executive branch, just as it 
is on all other domestic institutions.346 This fact alone carries 
 
 341. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 112 cmt. c (stating that courts will give “substantial respect” to the views of the 
executive branch on questions of international law). 
 342. See Air Can. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1483, 1486–87 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(observing that an executive-branch interpretation of an executive agreement is likewise 
entitled to deference); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 326(2) (extending the deference doctrine to all “international agreement[s]” 
concluded by the executive branch). 
 343. E.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 253, at 1100–02. 
 344. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118 
YALE L.J. 1762, 1793–94 (2009). See generally Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging 
New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (2006) (examining the 
increasing role of the executive branch in enforcing federalism constraints on the treaty power). 
 345. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
953, 975–1019 (1994) (canvassing the treaty-interpretation cases of the Rehnquist Court at the 
time and concluding that “in all but one the holding followed the express wishes of the executive 
branch of the government”); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power 
and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1737–52 (2007) (reviewing the rise 
of such deference in the early twentieth century). The historical foundations for such deference, 
however, are suspect, to say the least. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch 
Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 505–22 
(2007) (demonstrating that in the first fifty years of the Constitution’s history, the Supreme 
Court afforded little or no deference to executive-branch treaty interpretations). 
 346. See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) 
(declaring that judgments within the authority of federal courts “may not lawfully be revised, 
overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government”); Hayburn’s 
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important “collateral consequences,”347 for judicial missteps may 
wrongly constrain, or at least embarrass, the executive branch in its 
conduct of the nation’s foreign relations. Moreover, correction of 
such missteps at the international level is difficult, if not impossible. 
The executive branch cannot compel a renegotiation of a treaty or 
executive agreement in the wake of a misguided precedent, and it 
certainly cannot unilaterally change customary international law.348 
The executive branch nonetheless has a continuing obligation to 
manage America’s relations with foreign states within the bounds of 
the law. The consequence is that a judicial ruling on the nation’s 
obligations under international law—or on the reciprocal obligations 
of foreign states—entails distinct risks of compromising the special 
need for a “single-voiced statement” in foreign affairs.349 
But here again, I return to a familiar theme: the concerns that 
animate ex ante deference to the executive branch on matters of 
international law do not evaporate once a court has in fact created a 
precedent. Indeed, the executive branch’s continuing conduct of 
foreign relations—including the practical performance of treaty 
obligations350 and of practices relevant for customary international 
law351—may have a direct influence on the content of the law 
notwithstanding a “final” precedent on international law. These 
 
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792) (noting that under the Constitution, executive officers 
are not authorized to sit on courts or to render judicial opinions). 
 347. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (emphasizing that the “collateral 
consequences” of recognizing domestically enforceable torts for violations of international law 
“should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398, 432–33 (1964) (noting the special role of the executive branch “as an advocate of 
standards it believes desirable for the community of nations and protective of national 
concerns”). 
 348. Substantial scholarly controversy exists over whether the president is bound by 
customary international law at all. For an introduction to these debates, compare Michael J. 
Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the 
Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321 (1985), and Jordan J. Paust, The President Is 
Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (1987), with Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 4, and Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. 
REV. 1205 (1988). See also Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 930, 936–37 (1986) (arguing that the president may disregard customary international law for 
purposes of American law only within his exclusive constitutional powers).  
 349. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“[Q]uestions touching foreign relations are 
political questions. . . . [S]uch questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the 
Government’s views. Yet it is error to suppose that every case . . . lies beyond judicial 
cognizance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 350. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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legitimate executive-branch actions in the external realm represent a 
further exogenous force of change that may work to erode the 
foundations of a precedent. Adherence to the traditionally rigid 
version of stare decisis would prevent ex post consideration of all of 
these distinctive factors in foreign affairs. 
By contrast, there is nothing unusual or particularly problematic 
about judicial flexibility in a field of special executive authority. The 
Supreme Court’s even more extreme approach in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services352 illustrates 
the point. At issue in that case was the status of an administrative 
agency’s interpretation of a statute subsequent to a contrary decision 
by a federal court of appeals.353 The Supreme Court held, in applying 
the Chevron354 doctrine,355 that stare decisis principles do not preclude 
the recognition of a later agency interpretation, as long as the 
interpretation is reasonable and is within the scope of the delegated 
authority.356 
A similar perspective should inform the courts’ approach to 
judicial precedents on international law. Some scholars advocate a 
robust version of the Chevron doctrine for foreign affairs matters in 
general.357 Whatever the merit of this broad proposition, nothing 
about the judicial station in general or about the values served by 
stare decisis precludes recognition of the continuing executive 
influence in a particular field of law. And in no field is executive 
authority more pervasive than in foreign affairs. 
 
 352. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 353. Id. at 982. 
 354. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 355. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (“In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes 
within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the 
statutory gap in reasonable fashion.”). For recent examinations of the Chevron doctrine, see 
generally Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 
(2007); and Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004).  
 356. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983 (“Neither Chevron nor the doctrine of stare 
decisis . . . . preclud[es] agencies from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous 
statutes.”). 
 357. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 653 
(2000) (explaining “why Chevron deference [to the executive branch’s interpretation of 
international law] is not appropriate today”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing 
Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (“Drawing an analogy to the 
administrative law doctrine of [Chevron], . . . courts should generally defer to the 
executive[,] . . . . [and any] exceptions here are the standard exceptions to Chevron itself . . . .”). 
But see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230, 1236–45 (2007) (broadly rejecting enhanced judicial deference in foreign affairs). 
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My analysis here is not a plea for judicial abdication. To the 
contrary, the very existence of stare decisis fuels a pernicious 
feedback loop of judicial reasoning on matters of international law. 
Precisely because of inflated concerns about the lock-in effect of 
precedent, the courts may defer to executive-branch desires as a 
matter of ex ante routine. The executive branch, however, is a 
political branch and is thus subject to shifting political preferences.358 
The strikingly different views of the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations regarding the executive branch’s power to compel 
compliance with a non-self-executing treaty prove this point starkly.359 
Unthinking acceptance of executive preferences also tilts the 
lawmaking field decisively against Congress, for any attempt—even 
by majorities in both houses—to displace a particular act of inflated 
judicial deference would face a probable presidential veto and the 
near-impossibility of an override by the required two-thirds majority. 
For matters within the Article III mandate, the “province and 
duty”360 of the federal courts to identify and enforce the law also 
extends to international legal norms. The proper response to the 
courts’ unease about treading on presidential prerogatives in foreign 
affairs is not to surrender this essential judicial function to the 
executive branch. The solution, as I explain in Part IV, is a more 
accommodating understanding of stare decisis. The flexibility 
inherent in this approach is fully consistent with the values that 
animate the doctrine, but it is also appropriately sensitive to the 
 
 358. Even the Office of Legal Counsel has felt pressure from the executive branch to depart 
from its own past legal opinions. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal 
Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1483 (2010) (offering the example of the U.S. Postal 
Service’s “attempt to persuade” the Office of Legal Counsel to “reconsider and rescind” a prior 
opinion). 
 359. Reasoning that the treaty at issue, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, was 
not self-executing, the Clinton administration informed the Supreme Court that the executive 
branch did not have the authority to compel domestic enforcement. See Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214) (“The 
‘measures at [the United States’] disposal’ under our Constitution may in some cases include 
only persuasion . . . and not legal compulsion through the judicial system.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional 
Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Apr. 9))). The administration of President George W. Bush took 
the directly contrary view. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 51–53, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2006) (No. 04-5928) (asserting that the 
decision to enforce international-law obligations through domestic law is within the unilateral 
discretion of the executive). 
 360. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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judiciary’s special institutional station in the domestic enforcement of 
international law. 
IV.  THE ANALYSIS DISTILLED: INTEGRATING STARE DECISIS AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
This final Part pulls together the various themes I have explored 
to advance an argument for enhanced judicial modesty when 
reviewing international-law precedents. Specifically, Section A 
demonstrates that the distinctive considerations that attend judicial 
action involving international law should function as additional 
“special justifications”361 for revisiting the original and continuing 
validity of a precedent in the field. Section B then explains why the 
argument for increased flexibility toward precedents on international 
law is especially compelling for the stare decisis practice of the federal 
courts of appeals. 
A. “Special Justifications” and Judicially Enforceable International 
Law 
Stare decisis does not admit of clean categories. It is a prudential 
doctrine animated by pragmatic impulses about stability and system 
integrity. Discerning the force of a given precedent involves weighing 
these systemic values against situation-specific countervalues that 
focus on the precedent’s original and continuing validity. In the end, 
stare decisis functions as a simple preference for finality. 
Extant stare decisis principles remain appropriate for purely 
domestic statutes, as well as for derivative administrative 
regulations.362 When a purely domestic legal norm defines the content 
of the law without reference to international sources, faithful judicial 
enforcement of the value judgments made by domestic authorities 
avoids the fact, and should even avoid the appearance, of 
independent judicial agency in foreign affairs lawmaking. Moreover, 
the task of interpretation in such cases involves traditional and 
familiar domestic source materials and institutional relationships. 
Finally, as a matter of purely domestic law, all forces of subsequent 
legal change are endogenous to the system and thus are within the 
final judicial authority of the Supreme Court. In this context, it is 
entirely appropriate for the courts to respect their own precedents 
 
 361. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984). 
 362. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
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and to leave future adjustments to the original source of the law: 
Congress.363 
In matters of international law, by contrast, these special 
considerations compel a more nuanced understanding of the proper 
force of precedent. To be sure, the benefits of stability, predictability, 
and judicial legitimacy support a prima facie respect for precedent in 
international law as well as in domestic law. My analysis 
demonstrates, however, that on questions of international law, the 
justifications for adhering to judicial first impressions are inherently 
weaker, and the potential grounds for reexamination are inherently 
stronger. Specifically, I have argued that both the likelihood and the 
consequences of judicial error are greater, that judicial precedents are 
particularly susceptible to rapid erosion by exogenous forces of 
change, and that institutional considerations make judicial leadership 
particularly problematic. 
Nevertheless, the special considerations that affect international-
law precedents by no means constitute an all-purpose trump card. 
That is, they do not represent an open-ended invitation to the courts 
to engage their own predilections and pursue situational justice free 
from concerns about the implications of precedent. Rather, these 
special considerations should function as one significant weight on the 
scale—one additional argument in the nature of a stare decisis 
antivalue.364 To use the vernacular of the doctrine, they may alone 
constitute a “special justification” for reexamining a precedent.365 
Even with this new “special justification,” the requirement of 
actual, demonstrated justifications will remain for deviations from 
international-law precedents. For one thing, not all matters of 
international law are infected with uncertainty. One might think here 
of an unambiguous provision in a bilateral treaty that finds consistent 
support in secondary interpretive materials. In such a case, the values 
of stability, predictability, and judicial legitimacy would continue to 
support adherence to precedent. 
In general, newly discovered information and evidence of 
developments exogenous to America’s domestic system will present 
 
 363. Under Brand X, an administrative agency also may have a limited power to reinterpret 
a statute within the scope of the authority delegated by Congress. See supra notes 352–56 and 
accompanying text.  
 364. See supra Part I.C. 
 365. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (“Departure 
from precedent is exceptional, and requires ‘special justification.’” (quoting Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 
212)); supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
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the most compelling grounds for revisiting a precedent. Some judicial 
decisions in the field, however, will tread on the prerogatives of the 
political branches more directly.366 As a result, reexamination will be 
especially appropriate for precedents that define the nation’s formal, 
sovereign obligations under international law. By contrast, for 
international law governing purely private legal relations—such as 
private-law treaties367—courts may properly demand convincing 
evidence of subsequent developments to justify revisiting a precedent, 
especially if counterbalanced by significant private reliance 
interests.368 More generally, a consensus may coalesce, even around 
delicate and ambiguous issues, through the accumulation of 
experience and consistent judicial interpretation over time. 
This analysis suggests as a guide the civil-law notion of 
jurisprudence constante369—or its cousin in German law, ständige 
Rechtsprechung.370 The idea in this Article is that even without a 
formal doctrine of stare decisis, the attractive force of a particular 
precedent increases as courts consistently accept and apply it in later 
cases. The parallel to American law’s own notion of stare decisis is 
apparent. The significant difference, however, is that formal respect 
for precedent does not attach to the first judicial intuition on a 
subject; rather, it arises through consistent reaffirmation after 
reflective reexamination over time. And, significantly, this approach 
is decisively informed by a respect for the lawmaking prerogatives of 
 
 366. See supra notes 298–302 and accompanying text. 
 367. An example is the growing class of commercial-law treaties, such as the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. For a broad examination of the 
interpretive approach of these private-law treaties, see generally Michael P. Van Alstine, 
Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998). 
 368. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. Private reliance interests, however, may 
become less convincing as divergences create jurisdictional uncertainty and, thus, the 
opportunity for forum shopping. 
 369. See SongByrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc., 104 F.3d 773, 776–77 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(describing “jurisprudence constante” in Louisiana civil law); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. 
FitzGerald Contractors, Inc. (In re Whitaker Constr. Co.), 439 F.3d 212, 224–25 & n.12 (5th Cir. 
2006) (same). 
 370. See Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany, in 
INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS, supra note 242, at 17, 50 (“A line of precedent has a much greater 
weight than a single case. A line of precedent that has been established for some time is called 
‘permanent adjudication’ (ständige Rechtsprechung).”). 
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the legislature, and thus by the principle that judges fundamentally 
are law finders, not lawmakers.371 
Similar sentiments are appropriate in America’s federal courts 
when they create precedents on international law. The spirit of stare 
decisis should remain. It simply must be calibrated in light of the 
special contextual and institutional considerations that obtain in the 
field.372 
Control over the reexamination of a particular precedent, 
however, should remain solely with the Supreme Court, or with a 
later panel of the same appellate court, as described in more detail in 
Section B.373 In other words, the flexibility advocated in this Article 
would affect only horizontal stare decisis. Vertical stare decisis would 
continue to require adherence to precedent by lower courts to the full 
extent of the existing law.374 This dimension thus would continue to 
secure the values of stability and predictability advanced by a 
hierarchically integrated judicial system. 
Careful reflection also reveals that this perspective echoes 
certain threads of existing stare decisis doctrine. Extant jurisprudence 
recognizes that subsequent factual and legal events may undermine a 
precedent.375 What courts and scholars have not fully appreciated, 
however, is that in matters of international law, change of this 
nature—perhaps rapid and significant change—is baked into the 
system.376 In a separate vein, some persuasive observations of the 
Supreme Court suggest that a less rigorous standard should apply 
when the courts take the lead in lawmaking, such as with “judge-
made” procedural rules377 or federal common law created pursuant to 
 
 371. See Zenon Bankowski, D. Neil MacCormick, Lech Morawski & Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, 
Rationales for Precedent, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS, supra note 242, at 481, 482–85 
(examining this foundation for the civil-law approach to precedent).  
 372. Of course, the flexibility I advocate in this Article would not affect the normal res 
judicata principles that apply to a final decision in a specific case.  
 373. See infra Part IV.B. 
 374. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (declaring that if a Supreme Court 
precedent applies, “the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving 
to th[e] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”). 
 375. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 376. For the rare instances in which scholars have recognized that the special attributes of 
international law might affect the force of stare decisis in the field, see supra note 5. 
 377. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816–17 (2009) (rejecting application of 
“the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress” with respect to 
“judge made” procedural rules); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (contrasting the 
strong stare decisis effect for property and contract-rights cases with its effect for cases 
“involving procedural and evidentiary rules,” for which “the opposite is true”). 
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delegated authority from Congress.378 The argument for flexibility is 
even more compelling in matters of international law, an area in 
which judicial leadership propelled by enhanced discretion is both 
more pervasive and more consequential. 
In light of these considerations, the lock-in effects of precedent 
involving international law are particularly problematic. Judicial error 
involves impermissibly enlarging or narrowing the rights or 
obligations that govern the nation’s legal relations with foreign states. 
And as I have shown, the practical hurdles to override by the political 
branches are considerable. The one recognized categorical distinction 
in stare decisis jurisprudence justifies a weaker version of the doctrine 
for constitutional matters precisely because of the difficulty of 
override by other constitutional institutions.379 A more relaxed 
understanding of precedent on international law would accommodate 
these special institutional considerations. That understanding would 
enable—but not require—the courts to reexamine the original and 
continued propriety of their leadership and also to consider even 
informal expressions of intent from Congress and the president in the 
future. 
Finally, an enhanced openness to reexamining international-law 
precedents would strengthen the institutional position of the 
judiciary. A nuanced form of stare decisis frees the courts from the 
binary trap of supine deference to the executive ex ante or inflexible 
adherence to precedent ex post. The executive branch indeed has 
special responsibilities in foreign affairs. But demanding consistency 
across administrations when the executive makes claims to judicial 
deference, at least in the absence of compelling reasons for change, is 
no affront to the executive’s status in this field. The first 
administration to weigh in should not have the final word on the 
content of the law. 
Modesty and flexibility in this sense are thus empowering. An 
express recognition of the special considerations that affect the 
authority of international-law precedents would empower the courts 
 
 378. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007) (stating 
that “[s]tare decisis is not as significant” for the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006), because 
“[f]rom the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute”). As 
Professor Eskridge explains, the rationale for this approach is that when Congress delegates 
lawmaking discretion through such statutes, the courts “should also be given the leeway to 
experiment and overrule prior interpretations in a common law fashion.” Eskridge, supra note 
67, at 1378. 
 379. See Martinez, supra note 5, at 486 (suggesting a similar point). 
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to make independent decisions with a flexibility that would permit, 
but would not require, reexamination of the foundations and 
consequences of their actions in such an important field. In short, the 
flexibility advocated in this Article reserves to the courts their field of 
institutional expertise, leaves room for appropriate executive-branch 
influence, and does not force on the legislative branch a task of pure 
interpretation for which it is ill suited. 
B. Local Courts, International Obligations: The Special Demands for 
Stare Decisis Modesty in the Federal Courts of Appeals 
It is curious that the Framers structured the Constitution to 
protect against divergent interpretations of the nation’s international 
legal obligations by the disparate state courts380 but that, in practice, 
the vast bulk of this work is done by independent and geographically 
segmented lower federal courts.381 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
 
 380. The leading case on this point is Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 
(1816). In that case, a treaty case, the Supreme Court warned that if it lacked final judicial 
authority to review divergent judgments and “harmonize them into uniformity,” federal law 
“would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same 
construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states.” Id. at 348. 
 381. The original conception was strikingly different. In the founding era, international-law 
matters that could affect national authority—especially treaties—were under the mandatory, 
final control of the Supreme Court. Until 1875, the federal district courts did not have general 
federal question jurisdiction. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 127, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (granting 
general federal question jurisdiction). Until that time, state courts did the bulk of the work on 
treaty matters and related federal matters. The Judiciary Act of 1789 thus provided for direct 
appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from final state court judgments. Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87. The same statute granted final control to the Supreme Court on 
nearly all matters relating to foreign ambassadors or public ministers and to admiralty, the other 
principal international-law issues of the day. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77 (granting district courts 
jurisdiction over admiralty cases); id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . shall have 
exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public 
ministers . . . .”). Through a series of statutes enacted between 1868 and 1925, however, the 
unifying force of this control declined dramatically. See Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44 
(requiring Supreme Court Justices to ride circuit); Act of Mar. 3, 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 
Stat. 826 (creating circuit courts of appeals); Judiciary Act of 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (instituting 
discretionary Supreme Court review of treaty cases); Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726 
(limiting the Supreme Court’s appellate authority to cases in which a state high court declared a 
treaty invalid); Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (giving appellate jurisdiction to the 
Supreme Court (1) as of right, in cases in which a state high court declared a treaty invalid, and 
(2) via petition for certiorari, in cases in which a state high court questioned a treaty’s validity). 
Upon the creation of the circuit courts of appeal in 1891, Congress removed the right of direct 
appeal from district courts to the Supreme Court for treaty issues. Evarts Act § 5, 26 Stat. at 
827–28.  
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emphasized the demand for national uniformity in this field.382 But as 
Justice Scalia caustically observed in 2004 in specific reference to 
international law, “[T]he lower federal courts [are] the principal 
actors; we review but a tiny fraction of their decisions.”383 The facts 
richly bear out this observation: Over 99 percent of the appellate 
treaty cases in the first decade of the 2000s were decided by the 
federal circuit courts.384 A broader study by Professor David Sloss 
finds a similar percentage in the period from 1970 through 2006.385 
The principal cause of this phenomenon is the fact that in nearly 
all matters of federal law, litigants have an appeal as of right to the 
federal circuits.386 By contrast, since the Judiciary Act of 1925387 
eliminated appeals as of right from the circuit courts, even on treaty 
issues,388 effectively all appellate judgments are subject only to 
discretionary review by the Supreme Court.389 The practical effect of 
this system is that the independent, geographically dispersed courts of 
appeals provide the final judicial voice on nearly all matters of 
international law.390 
Few would argue that these regional appellate courts represent 
an effective medium for ensuring uniform fidelity to the international 
 
 382. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) 
(observing that “federal uniformity is essential” in foreign commerce); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (declaring that national interests “imperatively require[] that federal power in 
the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference”). 
 383. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750–51 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 384. A search of the Westlaw database reveals that of 1380 appellate opinions on the 
interpretation of treaties in the first decade of the twenty-first century, only 6 were from the 
Supreme Court. 
 385. This survey revealed only thirty-eight Supreme Court treaty cases between 1970 and 
2006. During the same time period, over 3200 lower court opinions referenced treaties. David 
Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT, supra 
note 205, at 504, 514–17. 
 386. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (providing for this right, except in matters within the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and in the rare case in which 
“direct review may be had in the Supreme Court”).  
 387. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
 388. See id. sec. 1, §§ 237, 240, 43 Stat. at 937–39 (defining the scope of review for circuit 
courts). For a comprehensive review of the growth of discretionary Supreme Court review since 
this statute, see generally Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections 
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649–1704 (2000). 
 389. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (providing that decisions of the courts of appeals may be reviewed 
by a writ of certiorari or by certification).  
 390. To be sure, a split in the circuits is one ground for discretionary Supreme Court review. 
SUP. CT. R. 10(a). But the evidence cited in this Section, see supra notes 384–85, amply 
demonstrates that even on the important subject of international treaties, the Court grants 
certiorari in only about 1 percent of cases. 
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legal obligations of the United States. The problem, however, is even 
more acute than it might seem. Nearly all of the precedents in the 
federal circuit courts come from panels—not from the entire circuit 
court sitting en banc. The reason for this fact is the so-called law-of-
the-circuit doctrine.391 Under this doctrine, which controls in every 
federal circuit,392 a precedent created by a single, randomly assigned 
three-judge panel is immediately and absolutely binding throughout 
the circuit. In the rare case in which a subsequent panel misses the 
message, later panels are obligated to follow the first precedent.393 
 
 391. For an analysis of stare decisis doctrine at the appellate court level, see generally Amy 
Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317 
(2005). 
 392. The Fifth Circuit’s summary in 2009 aptly captured the general approach. See United 
States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706, 709 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) (“One panel of this Court may not overrule 
the decision of a prior panel in the absence of en banc consideration or a superseding Supreme 
Court decision.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(acknowledging that “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until 
it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court 
sitting en banc”); State Bar of Cal. v. Findley (In re Findley), 593 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]hree judge panels of our Circuit are bound by prior panel opinions ‘unless an en banc 
decision, Supreme Court decision or subsequent legislation undermines those decisions.’” 
(quoting Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994))); Mendiola v. Holder, 
585 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We may not overrule another panel of this court.”); 
United States v. Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Only the court en banc may 
overrule circuit precedent, subject to a limited exception in the case of an intervening Supreme 
Court decision that is inconsistent with circuit precedent.”); United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 
58 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]his panel is bound by prior decisions of this court unless and until the 
precedents established therein are reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court.”); Peralta v. 
Holder, 567 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[P]rior panel decisions are binding upon newly 
constituted panels in the absence of supervening authority sufficient to warrant disregard of 
established precedent.” (quoting Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2009)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A 
panel of this court is under another constraint: we must adhere to the law of our circuit unless 
that law conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court.”); Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 430 
(6th Cir. 2009) (“The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent 
decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court 
sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”); Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (rejecting an argument because the present determination was bound by an earlier 
decision); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d. 694, 704–05 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It 
is well settled in this Circuit that a three-judge panel may not overrule a decision by an earlier 
panel.”); In re Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A panel decision is binding on 
another court panel unless overruled with the approval of the en banc court.”).  
 393. See McMellon v. United States, 387 F. 3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that “when 
there is an irreconcilable conflict between opinions issued by three-judge panels of this court, 
the first case to decide the issue is the one that must be followed”); Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 
255 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “when a later decision of th[e] court conflicts with 
one of [its] prior published decisions, [it is] still bound by the holding of the earlier case”); Ryan 
v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 198–99 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen two decisions of this court conflict, we 
are bound by the earlier decision.”).  
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This doctrine is severe indeed. It prohibits reexamination of the 
first panel’s precedent even in light of subsequent insights from other 
circuits.394 The Eleventh Circuit declared this point bluntly in 2000: 
“The fact that other circuits disagree with [our] analysis is 
irrelevant.”395 To be sure, the possibility of en banc review remains; 
but even this option by rule is “not favored and ordinarily will not be 
ordered.”396 
To present the point starkly, consider a hypothetical case in the 
Ninth Circuit. A panel majority may create a precedent on the 
international legal obligations of the United States that is binding on 
the entire circuit. This scenario would mean that a decision by two 
judges would control a circuit of over sixty million people—nearly 20 
percent of the country’s entire population. The precedent would be 
 
 394. See United States v. Coffey, 350 Fed. App’x 85, 86 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(rejecting the appellant’s argument because, “notwithstanding any reasoning that the prior 
panel may not have considered and holdings from other circuits to the contrary, th[e] panel 
[wa]s bound by [the prior panel’s] holding”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 
460 F.3d 515, 542 n.32 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]lthough another Circuit’s views are entitled to due 
weight by our Court, they are not ‘intervening authority’ that would justify our reconsideration 
of our precedents without en banc review.”), vacated on other grounds, 551 U.S. 1129 (2007); In 
re Yates, 287 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he three judge panel before which this appeal is 
currently pending has no authority to overrule [a previous case].”), rev’d on other grounds, 541 
U.S. 1 (2004); United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 74, 78 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (providing that an 
earlier decision may not be modified by a panel, even in light of subsequent developments); 
Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e do 
not believe that the circumstances exist for a panel to change the decision of the previous panel 
and that that subject is better addressed by an en banc court.”); Bell v. Hill, 190 F.3d 1089, 1093 
(9th Cir. 1999) (applying a holding rejected by other circuits because “a prior decision from [the 
Ninth Circuit could] only be revisited by a three-judge panel if it ha[d] been undermined by an 
intervening Supreme Court decision”); United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 16 n.16 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“We are bound, however, as a panel of this court to follow the clear precedent of our 
circuit.”); Garcia v. United States, 22 F.3d 609, 612 n.11 (5th Cir. 1994) (providing that a panel 
may not overrule previous panel decisions); United States v. Splawn, 963 F.2d 295, 295–96 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (noting that “a three-judge panel cannot overrule circuit precedent”). Only the 
Seventh Circuit has suggested a bit more flexibility. See United States v. Carlos-Colmenares, 253 
F.3d 276, 277–78 (7th Cir. 2001) (overruling a panel precedent after circulating the opinion to all 
active members of the court on the basis that all other circuits had arrived at a contrary 
conclusion).  
 395. In re USA, 624 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC 
v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 623 n.15 (11th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 396. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). As Professor Amy Sloan observes, the rigidity of the law-of-the-
circuit principle has spawned a variety of procedures for “informal en banc review.” Amy E. 
Sloan, The Dog that Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713 passim (2009). Even these procedures are 
rare, however, and ultimately might have problematic consequences for the rule-of-law 
principles at the foundation of stare decisis. See generally id. (exploring the relationship between 
stare decisis and informal en banc review). 
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impervious to subsequent review within the circuit—except through 
en banc review—and impervious to subsequent analyses by other 
circuits. The law-of-the-circuit doctrine thus effectively precludes the 
resolution of intercircuit conflicts on international law except in the 
rare circumstance of en banc review or the even rarer event of 
Supreme Court review. 
The result is a very real possibility of a localized patchwork of 
judicial declarations on the nation’s rights or obligations under 
international law. The drama of the directly conflicting 
pronouncements of the federal circuit courts over whether 
corporations may be held liable for international human-rights 
violations bluntly proves this point.397 To put it mildly, such a system is 
discordant with the “‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings 
with foreign nations’ that animated the Constitution’s allocation of 
the foreign relations power to the National Government in the first 
place.”398 
The rigid stare decisis practice of the federal circuit courts also 
precludes consideration of the exogenous forces of change that are of 
special significance for international-law precedents.399 And the 
overlay of divergent decisions of other appellate courts may make 
these forces even more potent. In spite of this difficulty, the law-of-
the-circuit principle operates as a nearly absolute bar to examination 
of subsequent developments in fact and law, the factors that the 
Supreme Court deems to be “[o]f most relevance”400 for reexamining 
a precedent. 
Moreover, the great bulk of lower court precedent is generated 
without the expertise of, and beyond the attention of, national 
institutions. It is no slight to observe that with their large, mandatory 
dockets, these courts may lack the necessary resources, expertise, and 
 
 397. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(declaring that “if the board of directors of a corporation directs the corporation’s managers to 
commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors, or use slave labor, the corporation can 
be civilly liable” under customary international law); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 
1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that corporations are not immune from liability under customary 
international law). But see Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“[C]ustomary international law does not impose liability against corporations . . . .”); Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that corporations cannot be 
held liable for human-rights violations under customary international law).  
 398. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)). 
 399. See supra notes 231–43 and accompanying text. 
 400. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007). 
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international perspectives to appreciate fully their special 
responsibilities when they first confront a difficult issue of 
international law.401 Unlike the Supreme Court, the sheer volume of 
cases in the circuit courts constrains access to executive-branch 
expertise, except on rare issues of national significance.402 And unlike 
the certiorari filter for the Supreme Court, the federal courts of 
appeals may not defer decisions on sensitive issues to await higher-
quality information, better lawyers, or increased attention by national 
experts.403 These challenges counsel against overconfidence in a first 
judicial attempt at a solution and thus recommend an increased 
openness to reexamining the factual and legal foundations of initial 
judicial impressions on matters of international law. And given the 
significance of judicial declarations on the international legal 
obligations of the United States, lower federal courts should not 
content themselves with the quality of arguments, factual and legal, 
presented by the lawyers who happen to appear before them the first 
time. 
Unfortunately, ample evidence suggests that the federal 
appellate courts in fact are not fully sensitive to the “responsibility of 
[their] stations”404 on such matters. As I have explained elsewhere, for 
example, it is not uncommon for lower courts to retreat to familiar 
local—and often idiosyncratic—interpretive techniques and 
substantive concepts to construe international treaties.405 This 
categorical error has led to the misguided observation by some circuit 
courts that “[t]reaties are construed in much the same manner as 
statutes.”406 Another example comes from the courts’ widespread 
 
 401. See supra notes 254–63. 
 402. As a matter of simple volume, a search of the Westlaw database for the first decade of 
the 2000s reveals that, as compared to 110 Supreme Court opinions, over 10,000 lower federal 
court opinions mention the words “treaty” or “international law.” Of those lower court 
opinions, only approximately 150 refer to an amicus brief by the “United States” or the 
“executive branch.” 
 403. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006) (providing that in nearly all matters, the Supreme 
Court reviews lower court decisions only by deciding to grant a petition for writ of certiorari), 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (providing that the federal courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions” of the district courts (emphasis added)). 
 404. Cf. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821) (observing that the Justices 
felt “the responsibility of [their] stations” in the enforcement of treaties). 
 405. See Van Alstine, supra note 223, at 1936–42 (using, as an example, a Seventh Circuit 
case that “retreated from” international precedent in favor of “the domestic law of the State of 
Illinois,” ultimately reaching a conclusion contrary to international precedent). 
 406. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 
Sacirbey v. Guccione, 589 F.3d 52, 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (approving this statement); Collins v. Nat’l 
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failure to honor the Supreme Court’s directive that domestic courts 
should give “considerable weight” to the judicial opinions of treaty 
partners.407 Of the nearly 1400 appellate treaty cases in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, only 12 even mentioned the views 
of the courts of “sister signatories.”408 
Nonetheless, the consequences of regional precedents on 
international law may be as significant as a Supreme Court decision 
would be; the consequences are certainly as significant within the 
affected circuit itself. And whether it recognizes or rejects a binding 
norm of international law, an appellate court is formally participating 
in the definition of international law. For this reason, the 
constitutions of some countries have reserved the power to make 
binding declarations on such subjects to a supreme court. A special 
jurisdictional provision in the German Grundgesetz, for example, 
requires lower courts to refer issues of customary international law to 
the German Constitutional Court if they are unsure about the legal 
issues.409 
In short, the case for judicial modesty on the force of stare decisis 
with respect to matters of international law is even more compelling 
for the federal courts of appeals.410 For such matters, the federal 
circuits should explicitly relax the law-of-the-circuit doctrine to 
permit later panels to consider subsequent legal and factual 
 
Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (declaring that similar principles apply 
for interpreting treaties and statutes). As noted, the Supreme Court’s loose rhetoric in Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon seems to support this point. See supra note 227. For both a treaty and a 
statute, interpretation “begins with [the] text.” Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010) 
(quoting Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
Beyond this obvious point, however, the Supreme Court throughout its history has emphasized 
that fundamentally different principles apply to the interpretation of international treaties. See 
supra Part III.A.  
 407. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 408. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010). The parameters of the corresponding 
search of the Westlaw database are available from the Duke Law Journal. For a positive 
counterexample involving customary international law, see United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 
2d 599, 635–36 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 409. See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic 
Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 100(2) (Ger.) (providing that if doubt arises over whether a 
rule of international law is part of federal law or over whether it directly creates rights and 
obligations for individuals, a lower court must refer the matter to the Federal Constitutional 
Court).  
 410. State supreme courts should adopt the same policy in the relatively rare cases in which 
they create international-law precedents for lower state courts. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-
Llamas, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005) (applying a treaty in a state criminal proceeding), aff’d, 548 
U.S. 331 (2006). 
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developments, the views of later courts, and the input of the executive 
branch.411 The result, granted, will be more numerous expressions of 
agreement or division among appellate panels. But on particularly 
sensitive issues, this dialogue will also more rapidly attract attention 
at the national level, whether from the executive branch or from the 
Supreme Court, and will at least create pressure for regional 
uniformity through en banc review. 
Again, however, vertical stare decisis should remain. To secure 
the essential benefits of stability and predictability, the power to 
reexamine precedent should remain solely with later appellate panels, 
not with the district courts.412 Nonetheless, by relaxing horizontal stare 
decisis, the courts of appeals will enhance the quality of their 
precedents by permitting reexamination founded on improved 
information and insight. At the same time, this empowering flexibility 
would limit the unavoidable consequence of fragmented, localized 
judicial leadership in the identification of the nation’s legal 
obligations under international law. 
CONCLUSION 
The field of foreign affairs, with its “important, complicated, 
delicate and manifold problems,”413 fundamentally is not the province 
of the judicial branch. Yet by express provision and structural 
implication, the Constitution nonetheless requires the courts to 
enforce a variety of legal norms that have direct implications for 
foreign relations. For these matters as well—to return to the 
foundational pronouncement of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison—it remains “emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is”414 and, by extension, to 
create precedent in the process. This immense judicial responsibility 
is only expanding as international legal norms assume increasing 
significance for the law and policy of the United States. 
Unfortunately, the traditional stone-carving tools of stare decisis 
are ill suited to the dynamics of this modern reality. In the expanding 
field of domestically enforceable international law, the unavoidable 
 
 411. The First Circuit has left the door ajar, albeit only slightly. See United States v. Chhien, 
266 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2001) (indicating that a panel precedent may yield “in extremely rare 
circumstances, where non-controlling but persuasive case law suggests such a course”). 
 412. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 413. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 414. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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consequence of increased judicial discretion is increased judicial 
leadership on issues at the core of the nation’s formal legal relations 
with foreign states. Moreover, the unfamiliar and evolving 
environment both increases the risk of initial error and compromises 
the power of a precedent to secure finality. The message of the 
analysis in this Article is that the courts should take to heart their 
own ex ante admonitions about improvident judicial action as they 
assess the ex post force of their initial impressions in this sensitive and 
dynamic field of law. 
